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Summary 
The EU Open method of Coordination (OMC) represents one strategy for pension 
reform that ideally combines agreement on common objectives with different 
institutional and national approaches as means of reaching these objectives. 
This paper will focus on the OMC in pensions, seen as representing a pension policy 
discourse, and how it relates to national pension policy in three particular countries; two 
member states; Germany and the UK and one non-member country; Norway. Each of 
the three countries represents different welfare state and pension models, i.e. the 
Bismarck-, the Beveridge-, and the Nordic model respectively. Two key questions are 
addressed: Does the OMC process promote a particular kind of pension system model 
through its goal of providing adequate, sustainable and modernized pensions? How 
does it compare to and does it challenge existing national systems as found in the three 
selected cases in terms of their institutional and normative foundations? In addition the 
paper briefly discusses in what way the OMC in pension potentially impact national 
pension debates and reforms. 
The empirical material applied for analysis focuses mainly on the National Strategy 
Reports and the Joint reports by the Commission and the Council. Theoretically an 
institutional perspective is followed stressing the interaction between different 
institutions of pension provision and the adhering discourses surrounding these 
institutions. Thus, institutions are seen as instruments for solving problems (for instance 
income security in old age) and at the same time they are expressing a normative content 
inherent in their specific solutions. In this way each pension pillar (seen as an 
institution) contains its own more or less particular discourse. This paper distinguishes 
between three particular discourses: Social right-, status security-, and a private pension 
discourse. 
Analysing the OMC pension discourse as laid out in the Joint reports, the following 
key elements are identified: Firstly, the issue of financial sustainability takes precedence 
over the goal of adequacy. To obtain sustainability there is a need to raise employment 
rates and to stem growth in public pension expenditures. Secondly, this argumentation 
implies a new division of pension pillars by increasing the role of occupational and 
private pensions. In addition, it entails internal normative changes of pension pillars by 
strengthening traits known from private pension insurance. Thirdly, the goal of 
adequacy is shaped by the financial sustainability discourse and its focus on public 
pension expenditures. Fourthly, seen as a pension model the OMC on pensions 
promotes a hybrid model of pension provision containing elements from all three 
pension systems, but with the important qualification that it is really «hybridization with 
a bias». This means that the model represents a new pension blend that contains fewest 
traits from the Bismarckian model and with more prominence to elements known from 
multi-pillar systems as well as minimum pension guarantees as found in the new post-
reform Nordic model. 
From this follows that this hybrid pension model has various implications in terms of 
challenges to national paradigms: In the German case we find a clear move away from
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 public first pillar provision and increasing reliance on second and third pillar 
provision. In addition, focus on minimum security challenge the status security 
orientation of the German system. For the UK there is no confrontation in terms of 
financial sustainability, implying a continuance of the tradition of pension privatisation, 
and providing a complex system of means tested benefits to secure minimum security. 
For the Norwegian case the hybrid OMC paradigm represents a challenge in terms of 
increasing reliance on occupational pension provision in providing standard security and 
by containing future public pension spending.  
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Samandrag 
EU sin opne koordineringsmetode (OMC) representerer ein strategi for pensjonsreform 
som ideelt kombinerer semje om felles målsetjingar med ulike institusjonelle og 
nasjonale tilnærmingar som middel for å nå desse måla.  
Dette paperet omhandlar den opne koordineringsmetoden innafor pensjonsområdet, 
forstått som ein pensjonspolitisk diskurs, og korleis denne er relatert til nasjonal 
pensjonspolitikk i tre utvalde land; to medlemsstatar; Tyskland og Storbritannia og eit 
ikkje-medlemsland; Noreg. Kvart av dei tre landa representerer og ulike velferdsstats- og 
pensjonsmodellar, respektive Bismarck-, Beveridge-, og den Nordiske modellen. To 
hovudspørsmål blir stilte: Fremjar OMC prosessen ein særeigen pensjons modell 
gjennom måla om å sikre adekvate, berekraftige og moderniserte pensjonar? Korleis står 
i så fall denne modellen samanlikna med eksisterande nasjonale modellar slik vi finn dei i 
dei tre landa og utfordrar den desse modellane i høve til institusjonell og normativ 
utforming? I tillegg diskuterer paperet kort korleis OMC prosessen kan tenkast å 
innverke på nasjonale pensjonsdebattar og reformer. 
Det empiriske materialet som utgjer grunnlaget for analysen er henta frå dei nasjonale 
strategi rapportane (National Strategy Reports) og fellesrapportane frå Kommisjonen og 
Rådet (Joint Report by The Commission and the Council). I teoretisk samanhang blir eit 
institusjonelt perspektiv nytta som vektlegg samhandlinga mellom ulike 
pensjonsinstitusjonar og deira tilhøyrande diskursar som omgjev desse institusjonane. 
Institusjonar blir slik sett som instrument for problemløysing (til dømes inntektssikring i 
alderdommen) og på same tid uttrykkjer dei eit normativt innhald som er innvove i deira 
spesifikke løysingar. Slik inneheld kvar pensjonspilar (forstått som ein institusjon) sin 
meir eller mindre særeigne diskurs. Dette paperet skil mellom tre diskursar: sosiale 
rettar-, statussikrings-, og ein privat pensjonsforsikringsdiskurs. 
På grunnlag av ei analyse av OMC pensjonsdiskursen slik den er lagt fram i 
fellesrapportane, finn vi desse hovudelementa: For det første står målet om finansiell 
bereevne over målet om adekvate pensjonar. For å oppnå berekraft er det behov for å 
auke yrkesdeltakinga og å demme opp for veksten i offentlege utgifter. For det andre 
medfører denne argumentasjonen ei ny arbeidsdeling mellom dei ulike pensjonspilarane, 
gjennom ei aukande rolle til arbeidsmarknads- og private pensjonar. I tillegg kjem 
interne normative endringar av pensjonspilarane, der trekk kjend frå privat 
pensjonsforsikring blir styrka. For det tredje, er målsettinga om adekvate pensjonar 
strukturert av den finansielle bereevnediskursen som særskild rettar merksemda mot 
offentlege pensjonsutgifter. For det fjerde, forstått som ein pensjonsmodell så fremjar 
OMC prosessen ein hybrid pensjonsmodell som inneheld element frå alle dei tre 
(idealtypiske) systema, men det må presiserast at den i røynda er ein hybrid med slagside. 
Dette betyr at modellen inneheld færrast trekk frå Bismarckmodellen og med meir 
vektlegging av element kjend frå liberale, fleirpilar system så vel som 
minimumspensjonsgarantiar slik vi finn dei innafor den nye postreformerte Nordiske 
modellen.
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Ut frå dette så vil den hybride pensjonsmodellen ha ulike implikasjonar i form av 
utfordringar til nasjonale paradigme: For Tyskland finn vi ei klar rørsle bort frå offentleg 
lovregulert forsyning til større vekt på individuelle private pensjonar. I tillegg kjem at 
fokus på minimumssikring utfordrar statussikringsorienteringa i det tyske systemet. For 
Storbritannia er det inga utfordring med omsyn til finansiell bereevne, noko som 
medfører eit framhald med privatiseringstradisjonen og bruken av eit komplekst system 
av inntektsprøvde ytingar for sikring av pensjonar på minimumsnivå. For Noreg 
representerer det hybride OMC paradigmet ei utfordring gjennom aukande vektlegging 
på arbeidsmarknadsbaserte pensjonar for å oppnå standardsikring og for å dempe 
framtidige offentlege pensjonsutgifter.  

  9 
Introduction 
Pension reforms all over the world take place within an international context of multiple 
pension reform ideas that are diffused globally by international organisations and 
different epistemic communities. In a European context, the EU Open method of 
Coordination (OMC) represents one strategy for pension reform that ideally combines 
agreement on common objectives with different institutional and national approaches as 
means of reaching these objectives. Open co-ordination is described as: «a mutual 
feedback process of planning, examination, comparison, and adjustment of the social 
policies of Member States, all of this on the basis of common objectives» 
(Vandenbroucke 2002: viii). The OMC was established based on mutual agreement by 
the Member States on policy objectives. It contains common guidelines, indicators and 
targets, as well as performance benchmarking and «good practices» exchange. Further, it 
encompasses the formulation of national action plans, peer reviews and joint 
monitoring of implementation. All this is done in an iterative, multi-year cycle process 
(Zeitlin 2003: 5). Within this framework, social inclusion and pensions were chosen as 
two areas of priority wherein the open method of co-ordination was made operational. 
Employment had already been launched as a priority by the Luxembourg process in 
1997. This was done under the Swedish Presidency of the Commission (Hemerijck 
2002). The EU established 11 principles for pension reforms, within three overall 
headings: Adequacy, financial sustainability and modernisation. 
This paper will focus on the OMC in pensions, seen as representing a pension policy 
discourse, and how it relates to national pension policy in three particular countries; two 
member states; Germany and the UK and one non-member country; Norway. These 
three countries are chosen as representatives of quite distinct pension regimes resulting 
from a long history of institutional development. Two key questions are addressed: 
Does the OMC process promote a particular kind of pension system model through its 
goal of providing adequate, sustainable and modernized pensions? How does it compare 
to and does it challenge existing national systems as found in the three selected cases in 
terms of their institutional and normative foundations? In addition the paper briefly 
discusses in what way the OMC in pension potentially impact national pension debates 
and reforms. 
Theoretically the development of pension systems could be understood within an 
institutional perspective stressing the interaction between different institutions of 
pension provision, the adhering discourses surrounding these institutions as well as the 
actors performing the discursive acts.  
There is a growing literature on the OMC covering different aspects of it. The first 
section very briefly presents some of these approaches, and in addition outlines the 
discursive framework to be applied in the subsequent analysis of OMC in pensions.  
Section three contains a succinct account of the three pension systems seen as 
paradigmatic cases of three different pension models: Beveridge, Bismarckian and the 
Nordic model.  
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Next, the paper turn to the OMC process itself, providing the historical background 
and describing the OMC for pension and how it works. To analyse the possible 
discursive impact of the open method the National Strategy Reports published in 2002 
and 2005 are scrutinised. One question to be addressed in this section is to what extent 
these Strategy reports reflect previous institutional pathways and welfare models and to 
what degree can we see modifications or what Zeitlin (2003) denotes as hybridization of 
welfare models present in their strategies for reform? As for Norway the recent pension 
reform proposal is applied to see if we can find parallel or deviating developments in 
this case as compared to the UK and Germany. The paper does not intend to cover all 
aspects of pension systems but will concentrate on two of the three key goals as stated 
by the European Council decision at the Laeken meeting in 2001, namely adequacy and 
sustainability. Finally the last section will provide a comparative discussion and some 
preliminary conclusions. 
An institutional and discursive perspective on OMC 
and pension reforms 
According to Laffan and Shaw (2005) two broad perspectives on OMC can be 
identified. The first one is concerned with the OMC as a new mode of governance, 
whereas the second which is of strongest relevance for the present study, focuses on the 
outcomes of the process in terms of policy output. A central inquiry within this strand 
of research is whether the method is seen primarily as a means of fostering 
competitiveness or improving social welfare. Some authors argue that the OMC is an 
ideational mechanism delivering neo-liberal reforms of social policies at reduced costs 
and they see the OMC as a discursive regulatory mechanism that redefines social policy 
in the light of economic performance (Jacobsson and Vifell 2003, Chalmers and Lodge 
2003). Other students argue that the OMC allows social goals to gain political influence 
within the EU and that it helps to promote welfare polices and not only market making 
policies (Trubek and Mosher 2003, Schmidt 2002).  
Most of the research on OMC in terms of social policy output focuses on the EES. 
One relevant perspective for the issue of pensions is the one laid out by Zeitlin (2003). 
His core argument is that empirical reality as concerns the work and welfare nexus does 
not support the basic view of the variety of capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001), welfare 
regime (Esping-Andersen 1990), and production regime theories stating that because of 
institutional diversity cross-national learning and policy transfer across regime types are 
hindered. In his view empirical reality reveal the development of «hybrid policy mixes», 
wherein countries starting from one original regime cluster starts to incorporate new 
elements borrowed from foreign models (Zeitlin 2003: 12). Examples of this are found 
in Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal, i.e. representatives from different 
welfare and work regime clusters. Thus, Denmark has been stepping up individualized 
labour market activation program and training for unemployed and others. In addition 
they have increased funding and strengthened the earnings related aspect of the pension 
system. Ireland has established new social partnership, increased social spending, 
promoted wage moderation and have obtained reduced poverty levels. Netherlands has 
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restricted disability pensions, has implemented a line of long term consensual wage 
moderation, and has been able to increase employment rates. Portugal has seen reform 
of unemployment systems and expansion of active labour market policy. These 
examples accordingly point to ways of meeting the service economy trilemma trough 
«hybridity».1 And according to Zeitlin:  
The OMC is specifically designed to assist member states in learning from another 
how to reconcile full employment, social cohesion and budgetary stability through 
a continuous cycle of contextualised benchmarking (op.cit: 16).  
Thus, contrary to the variety of institutions arguments, Zeitlin argues that in stead of 
impairing OMC, institutional variation may improve learning. The implications of the 
above discussion for the present paper is therefore to identify examples of hybridity 
within national pension reforms as well to clarify to what extent the goals of the OMC 
on pensions fits within the hybridisation perspective. An example of hybridisation 
within pensions would be when for instance Germany, a paradigmatic case of the 
continental social insurance model, starts to introduce elements from the multi-pillar 
model as is done in the form of Riester pension. In order to understand this institutional 
change we also have to scrutinize the discourses that support, resist and complement 
these institutional transformations.  
As concerns the discursive perspective attention will be given to those that focus on 
policy relevant discourses and on how discourses interacts with institutional structures 
(Bönker 2005, Taylor-Gooby 2005, Schmidt 2001, Radaelli og Schmidt 2004, Pochet 
2003). Schmidt (2001) defines discourses broadly as: «whatever policy actors say to one 
another and to the public more generally in their efforts to construct and legitimate their 
policy programs» (Schmidt 2001: 248).2 In this way discourse is understood as 
constituting both a set of policy ideas and values and an interactive process of policy 
construction and communication. These two dimensions, the ideational and the 
interactive further contain two essential activities each. Within the ideational dimension, 
which is the focus of this paper, there is a cognitive activity enabling actors to make 
sense of reality, involving knowledge, policy analysis, and information about problems, 
actors and resources. The normative activity on the other hand consists of assessing and 
judging reality and thus belongs to the framework of norms and values (Radaelli and 
Schmidt 2004: 364).3 The interactive dimension consists of the coordinative activity 
taking place when policy actors try to construct an agreed upon policy as well as a 
communicative activity wherein policy actors presents the policy for public deliberation 
and legitimisation (op.cit: 365).  
                                                 
1 The service economy trilemma point to the difficulty for national governments of simultaneously attaining budgetary 
restraint, earnings equality, and employment growth in an open economy, where international competition and 
technological innovation restrict job creation in the exposed (mainly manufacturing) sector, capital mobility inhibits 
fiscal expansion, and relative productivity remains low in the labour-intensive sheltered service sector.  
2 Although the definition is broad the focus on policy programs maybe to narrow in order to capture different levels 
of discourses and their interaction, including institutions and more general level system structures. Thus, for 
instance globalisation could be viewed both as an objective process but also as a distinct discourse in its own right 
with implications for national policy. 
3 This approach has much in common with studies of the ideas used in policy change, policy narratives, frames of 
reference, discourses, national identities, values, norms, collective memories (Rothstein 2000), policy stories (Ney 
2003). 
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In the present paper discourse is understood as part of an institutional perspective. And 
as a way of clarifying the relationship between discourses and institutions the metaphor 
of different pillars mentioned above is instructive. Thus each of the three main pension 
pillars; the public social, the occupational and the individual private one, to different 
degrees is sustained by a combination of three particular discourses which legitimises its 
practice.  
 This discourse contains both a cognitive and normative dimension which is linked 
together into more or less coherent narratives or policy stories. Very briefly described 
the core of the private pension insurance discourse is the private and voluntary entered 
insurance contract based on actuarially fair premiums. Within the status security 
discourse group insurance, compulsiveness and securing income according to income 
and status are key concerns. The social rights discourse centres on the equal rights of all 
pensioners as citizens and minimum security to avoid poverty and large inequities in old 
age. Looking at each of the three pillars, the individual private pension pillar is 
dominated by the market conforming pension discourse, and with little influence from 
the other two discourses. The occupational pillar contains elements from all the three 
discourses, but with the status security as the major constituent. The (public) social pillar 
pension discourse focuses on universal social rights and the key issue of securing an 
adequate minimum for every old person independent of previous labour market 
participation.  
A focus on ideas and discourse does not imply that other factors are ruled out in 
explaining pension system development and reform. The literature on welfare state and 
pension system change points to several factors accounting for change such as socio 
economic forces, political forces and party competition, political institutions and policy 
legacies, national political economies, transformative or preserving policy discourses, 
external shocks and crises, globalization and supra national political development 
through European integration and the role of international organisations (confer Clasen 
2005). The list of broad factors could be extended and within each factor a more 
detailed specification of independent variables could be outlined. Another distinction is 
between those who emphasise external forces such as globalisation as decisive for 
change, whereas others put most weight on internal factors for change, such as 
restructuring of the labour market from industrial to service production, population 
ageing and the costs of institutional promises of the welfare state, wherein the present 
and future costs of public pension systems looms large. According to Pierson (1998) 
these internal factors represent «irresistible forces» which both increase demands on and 
squeeze resources for the funding of traditional social policy programmes (Clasen 2005: 
11). 
In order to pinpoint to what extent there is hybridization going on within the 
pensions system of the three countries we need to lay out briefly the main elements of 
the three pension models wherein each of the three countries serves as paradigmatic 
cases. 
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Three models of pension provision: Germany, 
Norway and the UK as paradigmatic cases. 
A central distinction in the pension system/reform literature is the one between the 
Bismarckian and the Beveridgean model of pension provision (Bonoli 2000: 9–13). The 
Beveridge model is associated with flat rate payments and general revenue financing 
aimed at securing a minimum pension in order to alleviate poverty. Within this system 
standard security, understood as the provision of pension benefits reflecting previous 
standard of living during working life is considered to be outside the responsibility of 
the welfare state and ought to be solved through the private market of pension 
provision and/or occupational provision. The Bismarckian model on the other hand 
focuses on standard security rather than poverty alleviation. Initially this model was 
applied to industrial workers, and subsequently over a considerable span of time other 
groups were included. An important feature of this system was the emphasis on 
contribution based financing of the pension. This also meant that those unable to 
contribute had to rely on poverty relief. The Beveridgean system on the other hand as it 
in fact developed was based on tax financing, rather than contributions as was 
Beveridge’s own preference (Bonoli 2000: 11). The Nordic countries initially based their 
system on poverty alleviation through means tested systems, but during the 1950s and 
1960s an earnings-related scheme was added within the public scheme. Thus both the 
standard security and minimum security element was combined within a single public 
system. Here Sweden and Norway are the most proximate cases to this ideal type.  
As a major constituent of the whole welfare state edifice, the classification of pension 
regimes is highly congruent with the overall classification of welfare states into the 
familiar three types of welfare regimes: The social democratic regime where welfare 
arrangements cover the whole population and includes a fair amount of income 
redistribution and where consequentially access to welfare benefits is more 
decommodified than in other countries, i.e. being less dependent on market 
participation. The Continental or conservative model (Esping Andersen 1990) is 
characterised by social programs covering the working population only and providing 
earning-related benefits to this broad category. The liberal regime is distinctive in terms 
of its preference for social programmes targeted on the poorest groups of the 
populations, and in addition benefits are modest or low and therefore increasing the risk 
of jeopardizing the goal of adequacy for these marginal groups. 
The table below sums up some of the differences between the three models of 
pension provision along some key dimensions: 
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Table 1. Three models of pension provision  
Model: Social Insurance 
(Bismarck) 
Poverty Prevention 
(Beveridge) 
Combining Social 
insurance and poverty 
prevention (Nordic) 
Dimensions (of public 
provision):  
   
Target groups Economically active The poor Residents 
Key goal of provision Standard security to 
uphold previous living 
standards 
Minimum security to 
prevent poverty in old 
age 
Uphold adequate 
minimum security and 
provide a reasonable 
level of standard 
security 
Redistribution Moderate Limited  Substantial 
Financing Contributions and 
taxes, PAYG 
General taxation, PAYG General taxation and 
contributions, PAYG 
Replacement level of 
public pensions 
70.3% (Level of 
standard pension) 
20% (Replacement 
rate of basic pension, 
2003) 
c.50% (National 
Insurance pension, for 
a average earner) 
Relative importance of 
pillars in terms of 
income composition 
Public pillar dominant Public pensions less 
important, 
occupational pensions 
and individual private 
increasingly important 
Public pillar dominant, 
but occupational and 
private pensions more 
developed than in 
Germany 
Cases Germany The UK Norway 
 
With this as a background we now move to the European level in pensions. 
The OMC on pensions and other European pension 
initiatives 
The OMC on pensions can be traced back to the European Council of Stockholm in 
2001 when it was decided to apply the OMC to pensions (European Council 2001a). 
However it was back in 1999 with the issuing of the Commission communication on «A 
concerted strategy for modernising social protection» that pensions was mentioned as 
one of four objectives within a European agenda of social policy (European 
Commission 1999). The Lisbon summit in March 2000 provided the formal adoption of 
what was baptised the open method of coordination within European social policy 
(European Council 2000).4 As mentioned in the introduction the OMC contains 
common guidelines, indicators and targets, as well as performance benchmarking and 
«good practices» exchange. Further, it encompasses the formulation of national action 
plans, peer reviews and joint monitoring of implementation. All this is done in an 
iterative, multi-year cycle process (Zeitlin 2003: 5). A further key ingredient of the 
                                                 
4 The two central paragraphs of the presidency conclusion describing the method is quoted in Annex 1 of this paper . 
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method is the use of a decentralised method of coordination in which various actors 
such as the Commission, Member States, local and regional collectives, social partners, 
civil society all are supposed to play an active role in respect of the principle of 
subsidiarity (De la Porte and Pochet 2002: 28, Kohl and Wahlpal 2004). In sum then the 
OMC process could be described as an iterative four stage process encompassing the 
following steps (Eckardt 2005: 252):  
Firstly, Guidelines, objectives and indicators are drafted by the Commission. The 
quantitative and qualitative indicators are drafted by the Commission with the 
competent committees for instance the Economic Policy Committee and the Social 
Policy Committee. These are approved by the EU Council and the European Parliament 
has been consulted.  
In the next step National Action Reports or National Strategy Reports are provided 
by the member states which reflect how individual countries compare to the overall 
guidelines, objectives and indicators. The Reports explains how far the respective 
country has attained the goals, what policies have been implemented to reach the goal 
and what future policies are planned in the field.  
Thirdly, on the basis of the national reports Joint Reports are produced which 
includes examples of best or good practices. Here the Commission collects and 
compares the National Reports, and identifies best or good practices and provide an 
assessment of the efforts taken. The Commission should then ideally formulate 
recommendations about further actions to the individual member state. Having been 
drafted by the Commission the Joint Reports are discussed with the member states and 
again approved by the EU Council. Also at this stage the European Parliament has been 
consulted.  
Fourthly, a follow-up stage follows, wherein National reforms are decided and 
implemented by the member states. These decisions and implementations serve as input 
to updated National strategy reports which enables an evaluation of the progress made 
since the foregoing report.  
Because of this «..iterative process of periodic monitoring and peer review, mutual 
learning should take place, thus helping to identify superior policy solutions and to 
speed up policy transfers» (Eckardt 2005: 252).  
The OMC is applied differently from one field to another. In a classification based 
on the use of different Lisbon instruments Laffan and Shaw (2005: 16, table 3.2) finds 
that the relative institutionalisation of coordination processes was very strong for 
Macro-Economic Policy, Employment and Fiscal Surveillance, whereas 
institutionalisation within pensions was classified as being nascent (or emerging).5 In 
explaining the relative strength of institutionalisation across areas the authors point out 
three important factors: Timing; OMC become more embedded over time, Treaty basis; 
OMC’s require a treaty basis in order to develop fully (Employment has such a treaty 
basis), and concurrent extra-community coordination; OMC’s benefiting from a parallel 
                                                 
5 The indicators used were: Treaty basis, Announcement date of the process (timing), Community budgetary leverage, 
ECJ involvement, DG, Council formation, Established Common objectives, Indicators, EU targets, Member State 
targets, Benchmarking, Best practice, Guidelines, Community Action Programs, National Action Plans, National 
Strategies, Peer review process, Scoreboards, Council recommendation, Commission recommendations (Laffan 
and Shaw 2005: 12–13, table 3.1). The analysis covers 16 different areas where the OMC is applied.  
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coordination process are strengthened by it. For employment there is a parallel process 
through the OECD Jobs Strategy instituted in 1994). Although not exactly a parallel 
process the diffusion of the so-called multi-pillar model by the World Bank (1994, 2005) 
could also be seen as a factor strengthening the OMC in pensions. Within Europe, the 
influence of this model has been strongest in the former East European countries 
(Orenstein 2005). As several of these countries have become members of the EU, the 
influence of the multi-pillar paradigm may grow in the future (confer Sommer 2003). 
This is also recently emphasised in the Annex to the Synthesis Report on adequate and 
sustainable pensions where the increasing importance of private pension provision and a 
funded tier is related to the enlargement process and the entrance of countries such as 
Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia (European Commission 
2006a: 13). 
However, Laffan and Shaws classification does not take into account the possible 
interactional or indirect effect of intra-community parallel coordination. This is a 
particularly important point in the area of pensions where the overall objectives and the 
specific goals are strongly imbued by the parallel processes of the employment strategy, 
macro-economic policy and fiscal surveillance (SGP). Taking these other processes into 
account it could be argued that the institutionalisation within the pension area is 
indirectly quite strong. Recent reforms of the OMC process under the heading of 
«streamlining» add to this point. A need has been identified to provide a new framework 
for the open coordination of social protection and inclusion policies wherein an 
integrated structure is emphasised and a closer link to the Lisbon Strategy for Growth 
and Jobs is argued for. A major problem which legitimated this streamlining was an 
overloaded policy agenda, failing coordination and sometimes conflicting priorities. 
Streamlining implies to clarify:  
who does what, simplify reporting and backing up delivery through Union and 
National Lisbon Action Programmes. There should be an integrated set of Lisbon 
«guidelines» to frame Member State action Programmes, backed up by only one 
report at EU level and only one report at nation level presenting the progress 
made (European Commission 2005a: 5). 
In this way the national reporting burden is expected to be significantly reduced and 
different individual processes of coordination are brought together under common 
objectives. Thus as from 2006 the OMC for social protection and social inclusion now 
include poverty and social exclusion, pensions, healthcare and long-term care.  
In addition The High level group led by Wim Kok concluded on a focus on renewed 
growth, making growth and jobs the immediate targets. This also has consequences for 
the OMC in the future: 
The new approach clears away the jungle of existing reporting obligations. 
Essentially, it shifts the focus from co-ordination through multi-lateral discussions 
between 25 Member States and the Commission, on individual policy themes (the 
Open Method of Coordination), with a bilateral in depth dialogue between the 
Commission and Member States on a commitment based national action 
programme (European Commission 2005a: 33).  
The OMC is only one process among others which impacts national policy formation. 
The first concerns the creation of the internal market and two aspects of this: 
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promotion of labour mobility and the creation of an integrated financial market. In this 
context pension arrangement may limit the freedom of movement and secondly it 
concerns questions of drawing the boundary of public and private. With the adoption of 
the monetary Union the 3 per cent limit on public deficits and the objectives of the 
SGP, pressures on pensions as the costliest of social spending in terms of stabilizing or 
reduction of public pension spending were intensified. Demographic changes 
increasingly felt towards the mid-century aided the focus on questions of financial 
sustainability. In this context the Green paper on Supplementary pension (European 
Commission 1997) is important according to Pochet (2003) in encouraging 
diversification, i.e. increasing the role of private provision and creating a single 
integrated financial market. A central argument in the Green paper is that wage 
overheads would be less onerous if the rate of return on financial markets was higher. 
Further on market integration is expected to increase returns and so: 
..behind this argument lies another argument, that is not explicit but nevertheless 
evident: as the rate of return from a PAYG system is fairly weak, a partial switch 
to a private system would be as beneficial for employers as it would be for 
workers (Pochet 2003: 10). 
The Commission followed up on this by providing a Financial Services Action Plan. On 
of its aim was to establish a single financial market. Within the Lisbon Strategy this is 
seen as a key factor in boosting competitiveness of the European economy. As concerns 
the issue of mobility the argument is that existing pension arrangement is functioning as 
a hindrance and an important cause for the still weak inter-state mobility.6 
In regard of the public private divide the European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays an 
important role as guardian of competition law, as it posits the competence to define 
what is the responsibility of national collective provision and what is a market function 
(Pochet 2003: 6). Whereas third pillar pensions are bound by competition rules, the 
second pillar is a more mixed case.7 This is because both «economic» and «solidaristic» 
action (Leibfried 2005: 265) is involved in providing occupational pensions and also 
earnings related parts of the first pillar system. Thus: 
Wherever the welfare state is involved in «economic activity» both normative 
domains become relevant at the same time. European integration does 
acknowledge no-economic true, i.e. redistributive activity – but when in doubt 
«economic» and not «welfare state» activity is presumed (Leibfried 2005: 265).  
                                                 
6 The Commission has issued A Communication on «New European Labour Market, Open to all, with Access for all» 
(European Commission 2001). A plan of action to promote mobility follows this. Based on the recommendations 
of the Veil report on freedom of movement (confer Pochet 2003), the Commission set up a Pension Forum and 
had its first meeting in 2000. It was formally established in 2001 (Official Journal of the European Communities 
L196/26, 20.7.2001) and is set up to help the Commission to resolve issues connected to cross border movement. 
Norway is member of the forum since these issues concerns the EEA. EFTA has four seats in the forum which 
comprise 45 members consisting of Member states, social partners, pension funds. The Forum discusses matters 
where the Commission has requested an opinion, but no voting is taken within the Forum (OJEC 2001 L196/27). 
7 The EU also directly impact European pension policy through its policy of equality of men and women. Here ECJ 
decisions have ruled it illegal to subject men and women in private (individual and occupational) schemes to 
different contributions or premiums. 
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It is important to place the OMC in pensions within this broader context of market 
integration and a European competition regime and to focus on the interaction between 
these processes. This will be addresses in the final section of this paper.  
The aforementioned communication on «A Concerted Strategy for Social Protection» 
that initiated the OMC in pensions held that pension system should guarantee a decent 
replacement income and promote active ageing. At the Laeken meeting (14th and 15th 
December 2001) the Stockholm decision was finalised and eleven common goals for 
pensions was defined (European Council 2001b). The eleven goals were divided 
between three overall objectives of adequacy, sustainability and modernisation.8 Table 2 
below sums up the key words and terms found in the 11 goals set out in the Joint 
report: 
Table 2. OMC in Pensions: Keywords and terms 
Adequacy Financial Sustainability Modernization 
1. Preventing social exclusion  
(avoid poverty and enjoy a 
decent standard of living) 
4. Raising employment levels 
(High level of employment, 
provided by EES and consistent 
with BEPG) 
9. Adapt to more flexible 
employment and career 
patterns 
2. Enabling people to maintain 
living standards (Access to 
appropriate pension 
arrangement, maintain, to a 
reasonable degree, living 
standard after retirement) 
5. Extending working lives 
(pension system to offer 
effective incentives for the 
participation of older workers) 
10. Meeting the aspirations for 
greater equality between men 
and women 
3. Promoting Solidarity (within 
and between generations) 
6. Making pension systems 
sustainable in a context of 
sound public finances (may 
include reduction of debt and 
setting up of dedicated pension 
reserve fund) 
11. Demonstrating the ability of 
pension system to meet the 
challenges 
 7. Adjusting benefits and 
contributions in a balanced way 
(not overburdening the active 
generations)  
 
 8. Ensuring that private pension 
provision is adequate and 
financially sound 
 
Source: Composition based on SPC and EPC (2001).  
 
Given existing European pension systems of different institutional kinds, is it possible 
to discern whether the goals set up above lean more towards one of them than towards 
others? Or more strongly formulated: Do the goals specify a particular pension design? 
The goals set out are mostly of a general nature and include concepts and formulations 
that are both contested and allow for different interpretations in terms of meaning and 
implications. It is not possible to discern one specific normative model such as the one 
                                                 
8 The broad social and economic goals are listed in Annex 2 of this paper as they were stated in the Joint Report from 
the Social Protection Committee and the Economic Policy Committee. 
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found within the famous World Bank Report (1994) and its three pillar model. This is 
hardly surprising since the OMC in pensions is about having some common general 
goals, and allowing member states to pursue their own means in terms of institutional 
set up to reach the goals. Still, it is possible to read out some clearer traces from the 
guidelines and from the reading of the first Joint report of the Commission and the 
Council on adequate and sustainable pensions (2003). Firstly, it should be stressed that 
financial sustainability takes precedence over the other two general goals:  
The financial sustainability of pension system is a necessary precondition for 
adequate provision of pensions in the future and for this reason alone should be 
high on the priority list of all Member States’. Failure to ensure the financial 
sustainability of pensions in the long term will seriously jeopardise Member States’ 
efforts to maintain or even raise the adequacy of their public pension systems and 
would have other adverse economic consequences as well (European Commission 
2003: 7). 
The priority of sustainability is also visible in that five of the eleven guidelines focus on 
sustainability whereas three is devoted to each of the two other ones on adequacy and 
modernisation. In addition, the sustainability pillar is also the one most strongly «fed» by 
input from three other coordination processes, i.e. employment strategy, macro 
economic policy and SGP, which all are strongly institutionalised coordination 
processes.    
As described previously the renewed Lisboa Strategy of growth and jobs accentuates 
this point even more strongly as the other coordination processes such as pensions and 
social inclusion, are given status and importance to the extent they are instrumental in 
delivering on the overarching goals of the Lisboa Strategy and consistent with the new 
integrated guidelines. This division of coordination processes is clearly stated by the 
Commission: 
...the Commission will review the Open method of Coordination processes 
related to the Lisbon strategy with a view to establish their value added in the 
context of this new delivery and reporting structure. This implies that satellite 
OMC – and other sectoral processes can feed into the national Lisbon 
programmes to the extent that they directly relate to growth and jobs. Those 
processes that would no longer feed into the renewed Lisbon structure could be 
maintained for other policy purposes outside the Lisbon strategy (European 
Commission 2005b: 5).  
Thus the new streamlining leads to a clear division between OMC areas that is central to 
the growth and jobs strategy, for instance pensions, and those that are peripheral and 
secondary. On the other hand it should also be anticipated that these central OMC areas 
will internally be shaped towards the goals of the Lisbon strategy; focusing on goals that 
are considered instrumental for growth and jobs, whereas other goals within a specific 
OMC process with their own intrinsic legitimacy, but not considered to be instrumental 
may be silenced or downplayed.  
Two key elements are central in the sustainability discourse as found in the Joint 
Report, these are the need to raise employment rates and to stem growth in public 
pension expenditures. The first element structures the pension discourse by emphasising 
the need of pension systems to be employment friendly. This essentially means that 
participation in the labour market and the contribution this represent should be 
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rewarded by the pension system. Early withdrawal from the labour market should lead 
to lower pensions, whereas extended working life should be paid a bonus. The second 
element structures the pension discourse by linking public pension expenditures, the 
total tax burden, and employment in a specific way: 
To prevent adverse effects on employment, care should be taken to avoid 
increasing the total tax burden, in particular on labour, and to achieve a 
sustainable balance between taxes on labour, on the one hand, and other forms of 
taxation, including on capital on the other (European Commission 2003: 8).  
This chain of arguments points to tax increases as being an unsustainable way of 
addressing the increasing costs of the demographic change. It directly undermines the 
creation of jobs and employment and so will contribute in moving away from 
sustainability. From this follows also that public sector employment via tax financing is 
viewed as problematic to the extent it is seen as increasing the total tax level. Although 
not explicitly stated there is also a link to the understanding of globalisation here as 
global competition is expected to lead to a downward pressure on capital taxation, and 
so the «sustainable balance» above implies a reduction of taxes on labour and so again 
closes opportunities for public job creation via taxation. From this follows that the road 
toward sustainability leads to the increasing role of other pension pillars, i.e. 
occupational pensions and private individual pension schemes. In addition, public 
schemes are also to be reformed by increasingly incorporating institutional traits known 
from the second and third pillar and their adhering discourses such as increasing 
reliance on funding and defined contribution elements (for instance as found in the 
Swedish and Polish system of Notional Defined Contribution accounts). Accompanying 
this is a move towards increasing the individual responsibility for attaining adequacy in 
old age through extending working life through active ageing policies and by applying 
actuarial criteria of fairness stressing the symmetry of contributions and benefits.  
These overarching measures for achieving sustainability also structure the adequacy 
element of the pension discourse. The main message here is that in order to obtain 
future adequacy of pension, the individual will have to work longer and/or save more. 
Public earnings-related schemes will promise less income replacement in the future and 
so this must be compensated by an extended working life (to compensate for 
demographic adjustments) and savings through the occupational and the individual 
pension pillar. However, this does not mean that the individual is left alone in making 
these decisions. Direct subsidies to people who saves as in the German Riester pension 
reform is one form of help. More common are substantial incentives through the tax 
system in order to help people making the right choices. By using tax expenditures to 
partially finance increased savings through occupational and private pensions, overall tax 
levels can still be kept within limits, whereas the «hidden welfare state» is growing.  
The public cost containment and tax competitiveness view also frames how the 
minimum security element of adequacy is addressed. Whereas the problem of 
preventing social exclusion can be met by providing a universal non-means tested 
minimum pension or through a means tested guarantee pension, the joint report focus 
on minimum pension guarantees. This is in line with how this element of the pension 
system is understood as a subsidiary element: 
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Pension systems are generally designed to prevent poverty in old age, rather than 
alleviating it, by ensuring that everybody builds up sufficient elements in public 
and/or private schemes to remain financially independent of their relatives or 
public social assistance. The minimum guarantee schemes generally act as an 
ultimate social safety net for those with incomplete earnings (European 
Commission 2003: 23–24).  
An alternative understanding would be to se a minimum pension as a primary element 
alongside the build up of entitlements, to secure a universal social right to a minimum 
income in old age independent of previous labour market participation. Choosing the 
first understanding is more compatible with a focus on cost containment since a means-
tested minimum income guarantee is considered to be less costly than a universal 
minimum pension for instance based on residence. 
In sum then the OMC pension edifice foresee a future pension system where the 
public pension pillar has a still major but relatively less important role in providing 
income in old age as compared to the present system. A stronger focus on poverty 
prevention within the first pillar is envisaged, whereas standard security is increasingly to 
be provided through second pillar occupational and third pillar private pensions. This 
basic outlook is restated in the 2006 Synthesis Report (European Commission 2006a).  
National Strategy Reports in Germany and the UK 
and Norwegian reform plans 
So far a first round of National Strategy Reports were issued in 2002, the first joint 
report was published in March 2003. A second round of National Strategy reports came 
out mid-summer 2005 and a second Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable 
pensions was issued in February 2006 (European Commission 2006a) as part of the 
overall Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (European Commission 
2006b). In the following the main strategies as concerns obtaining adequacy and 
sustainability will be presented in order to describe some components of the national 
pension discourses in the three countries. It is not intended do give a full picture of all 
elements of the national strategies but to focus on those parts of it that throw light on 
questions of overall change of pension systems, i.e. in terms of balance of pillars and 
normative changes within these pension institutions as related to the two key issues of 
financial sustainability and adequacy.  
Germany :  F i nanc i a l  Su s t a i n ab i l i t y  t h r ough  
pa r ad i gm  sh i f t  
The National Strategy Report initially states that the recent pension reform is a reform 
within the system and not of the system. A broad based concept of sustainability is also 
highlighted:  
In principle, financial sustainability is achievable at various levels of provision. But 
that does not ensure the social sustainability of the system. For the Federal 
Government, the aim of a high level of old-age provision was, and is, non-
negotiable. In the context of the European discussion, let it be said that it is 
questionable whether a pension system is socially and politically «sustainable» at a 
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low level of benefit which is socially and socio-politically unacceptable (Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) 2002: 8).  
The 2002 NSR is built around the 2001 pension reform. This reform points back to a 
long period of debate that started at the end of the 1970s about the consequences of 
demographic transformations and its consequences for the pension system and which 
have gained momentum and has led to several pension reforms. In this context 
especially the 1992 reform was important by introducing pension adjustments in 
accordance with net wage trends (previously gross wage adjustment), incremental 
increase of age limits from 2001 onwards and introduction of actuarial reductions. The 
1999 Pension reform act introduced a demographic factor that was added to the 
pension adjustment formula.  
The 2001 reform contains three core elements: the aim to limit statutory pension 
contribution to 20% until 2020 and to 22% until 2030, to reduce pension levels, but not 
below 67 % and thirdly supplementing reduced public ambitions with supplementary 
and voluntary old age provision (however strongly sponsored by the public purse) 
assuring an compensation level to be at 70% in 2030. By applying a strategy of what is 
called targeted innovation the government aims at achieving a strengthening of 
individual responsibility and better cohesion of the three pillars of old age provision 
(FRG 2002: 2). Thus, financial sustainability is the focal point of the 2001 reform.  
The Report stresses the centrality of the labour market in achieving the aims of old 
age pension policy and financial sustainability. A high level of employment is adhered to 
in accordance with the European employment strategy.9 Increasing employment of 
older people and women, life-long learning and an employment friendly retirement 
system are important areas within this perspective. Thus active ageing policies are 
strongly integrated into the framework of solutions provided. Within the pension 
system a bonus-malus system was introduced in 2001, where early pensioning, i.e. 
before 65 years gives a 3.6% reduction of total pension per year of premature 
retirement, whereas continued employment after 65 is rewarded by a 6% bonus for each 
year the retirement is delayed. In addition previous special early retirement pathways are 
closed for new entrants, i.e. those born after 1951. 
A major point in the National strategy is to maintain the sustainability of public 
finances by introducing greater diversification of risk, through a system of 
supplementary capital covered old age provision in line with the principle of personal 
responsibility. The 2001 reform introduced the pension investment fund in addition to 
other forms of pensions saving. The new instrument gives more freedom of investment 
                                                 
9 The Job-AQTIV act, Act against unemployment of Disabled People, Immediate Programme for Reducing 
Unemployment among Young People, the Part-time and fixed-term employment act, the all-Germany «Mainz 
model» to promote the uptake of lower-paid jobs, and the Women and Work Programme are some of the means to 
increase employment levels. In addition, stronger priority of active aid over passive benefits in the Federal Social 
Security Act is promoted in order to integrate claimants into the labour market. 
   The «Alliance for Work, Education and Competitiveness» is a program intended to change the paradigm of 
labour market by making it more employment friendly for older persons. Measures include for instance to cover 
the costs for further training of older persons. This measure is also part of the Job-AQTIV legislation. In addition, 
several initiatives to change the way of thinking about older employees is launched, for instance «The 50-plus can 
do it». 
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opportunities on a global scale and is intended to strengthen the German capital market 
and increase growth and employment.  
Schmäl (2003) argues that the 2001 reform represents a clear paradigm shift in 
pension policy, that parallels the mainstream international debate, which advocate a new 
mix of public and private pension provision and a new mix of financing methods 
(Schmäl 2003: 118). In explaining this shift discursive changes is emphasised. There has 
been a shift in the view of the state, which reflects the demise of Keynesian macro-
economic thinking and the rise of neo-classic supply oriented micro-economy, and 
results in a negative view of public expenditures and its market disturbing effects. The 
Maastricht criteria also reflect this in demands for reducing public expenditure and 
public debt. In addition: 
The public debate was framed by the argument that demographic changes will 
bring about a «pension crisis»: the burden of public pension insurance will 
become unbearable – especially for the younger generation. «Generational equity», 
thus, became an important and powerful catchword in public debate. The 
conclusion that public pensions cannot remain at the present level was widely 
believed: Pensions have to be reduced and they will no longer be sufficient to 
maintain «standard of living» in old age in the future. Only a shift from public to 
private pensions could relieve the burden on younger generations. These opinions 
prepared the 2001 reform (Schmäl 2003: 118). 
A central component of the pension formula is the Earnings Point. If the individual’s 
earnings in a year are average, they get one Earnings Points. In 1992 the average was 
changed from gross to net earnings. The pension level for the standard pensioner (with 
45 Earnings Points) will as a result of the 2001 reform be reduced from 70 to 64 % in 
2030. The bonus-malus system for early retirement will imply that retirement at 62 with 
35 Earnings Points will have a replacement level at 44% of average net earnings which is 
close to the social assistance level at 40%. There are strong divisions between men and 
women in terms of pension level as very few women get the standard pension and a 
high percentage of them today have a pension lower than the standard pension. The 
intended reduction of the pension level will increase this percentage according to 
Schmäl (2003: 129).  
The National Strategy report understates the possible effects in terms of a lower 
replacement level for many future pensioners. Calculations in the NSR assume that 
people in fact will save the requested amount in order to keep up previous replacement 
levels. Thus what is reported is a best case scenario of development which gives the 
impression that adequacy of pensions is not compromised. In the Annex of the report 
the consequence of the new system is stated more clearly: «In the long term, a 
reasonable standard of living in old age can only be achieved by supplementary old-age 
provision, and state support for this is a key element of the reform» (FRG 2002, Annex 
II: 11). In practice this means that the «Lebensstandardsicherungs» principle is partly 
abandoned as part of the goal of statutory provision in the long term and it is up to the 
individual to secure this by additional savings through the new private pension 
instruments. 
As concerns the minimum security element of adequacy this point to a challenge of 
the German system built on statutory provision of standard security which aims at 
providing a reasonable standard of living related to former income. The statutory system 
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covers broadly, i.e. around 88% of working people in Germany, but for those 
uncovered having inadequate income sources in old age they have to rely on family 
support and/or social assistance.10 Elderly people often do not claim social security, 
because they fear the social security offices will claim maintenance from their children in 
accordance with German family legislation and the principle of reciprocal obligation of 
support (unterhaltspflichtig) (Op.cit: 12, Ploug and Kvist 1994: 190).11 To overcome this 
problem the new pension reform introduces the Needs-related basic insurance. This 
basic insurance aims at providing everyone with a minimum income in line with what is 
provided by the non-institutional subsistence relief under the Federal Social Security 
Act. Benefits are dependent on means, i.e. there is an income and asset test as for social 
security (Sozialhilfe). But there is no claim of maintenance against children and parents 
with an annual income below EUR 100 000, if their relatives claim basic insurance. 
Measures to improve old age provision for women including the new enhancement of 
low pay during the childcare stage for pension calculation purposes, child weighting of 
contribution periods in pension calculation, equalisation measure for care of several 
children and reform of survivors’ pension law, introduced by the 2001 reform also 
contribute in securing adequacy of pensions.  
Whereas the 2002 report gave a broader sustainability legitimisation for the system 
emphasising the importance of adequacy and the level of provision, the 2005 report is 
more concerned with social policy as a contributor to promoting growth and 
employment: «social security is a productive economic factor which creates the major 
preconditions for a flourishing economy» (FRG 2005: 6). Thus social security is seen as 
instrumental in providing growth and jobs because with confidence in the system and its 
provision of social security consumers’ confidence and people’s willingness to invest is 
secured.  
The 2005 report states that the ambitions of the government are in line with the 
refocused Lisbon Agenda emphasising growth and employment. It is the «Agenda 2010» 
that presents the main strategy and within that strategy one of the major goals is to 
safeguard the financial foundation on which social security is based, and to reduce 
additional wage costs. This implies that within pensions focus will be on policies of cost 
containment. The government seems to be in a state of war where it is in need of: 
«building a line of defence for old age pension provision against future demographic 
trends» (op.cit: 6). The key in that defence is however a substantial increase in additional 
non-statutory private or occupational pensions, i.e. the introduction of the Riester 
pension, although with substantial state support. It is said that this will guarantee 
adequate old-age provision also in the future, but clearly this can only be guaranteed to 
the extent individuals and households make the necessary savings needed and have the 
                                                 
10 In 2000 the number of recipients of subsistence relief aged 65 and older was 185 831 (10.5% of all recipient and 
1,4% of the population)( op.cit: 18). 
11 The figures above therefore may understate the number of older people with inadequate incomes. 
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ability to do so.12 In communicating the reforms the government argues that the 
statutory old-age pension insurance will continue to be the most important pillar of old-
age provision and so continuity is stressed. On the other hand the Riester reform is 
described as part of a: 
... paradigm shift in pensions initiated by the federal government in 2001 (that) is 
under full steam, and the share of private pensions among the universal spread of 
capital-covered pensions is considerable (op.cit: 11).  
The measures adopted in 2004 which makes up the main bulk of the changes since the 
2002 report are based on proposals put forward by an independent «Commission for 
Sustainable Funding of the Social Security Systems». The Commission consists of 
members from the academic community and relevant organizations, i.e. social partners, 
private insurance companies, employers and economic consultants. The NSR states that 
the Commission has prepared and exerted a strong influence on pension reforms in the 
country (Op.cit: 12). The main recommendations of the Commission included the 
introduction of a «demographic component» within a new pension formula and a 
gradual increase in the retirement after 2011 (Clasen 2005: 117).  
The heart concerns of the government consist firstly in providing statutory target 
values for pension levels and contribution rates in the long term. This represents a shift 
from a expenditure oriented policy, where the level of expenditure decides the level of 
contributions needed to cover expenditures to a «revenue-oriented expenditure policy», 
where fixed contribution limits controls the amount of spending (Schmäl 2003, Clasen 
2005). In this way the defined contribution approach as known from private individual 
and occupational schemes gain importance within the statutory framework. The aim of 
the government as concerns the lower limit of the benefit level before tax is that this 
should not go below 46% until 2020 and 43% until 2030. Correspondingly the 
contribution rate is to be 20% until 2020 and not exceed 22% until 2030. The core 
points in the stabilisation of the contribution rate, is that this will contribute in 
stabilising the supplementary wage costs and thereby safeguard future employment. The 
redefinition of the lower limit of provision reduces burden on the federal budget, which 
then can be used to consolidate the budget and to produce a further reduction in the 
burden of taxes and charges (op.cit.: 9).  
Secondly, the indexing of benefits to wages and contributions and the actuarially 
calculated deductions and bonuses provide strong incentives for employment and so are 
geared towards the aim of public cost containment and economic growth. This could 
also be seen as the key discourse which mainly is an economic sustainability discourse 
wherein the mainstay of values is that of public cost-containment and the creation of 
economic growth to boost employment (preferably within the private sector). Pension 
policies are framed by this overall discourse and its imperatives in that pension policy 
ought to be instrumental in achieving these overall goals. This also means that the 
intrinsic legitimacy of social and pension policy for instance through a social right 
                                                 
12 Changes in contribution rates may illustrate the substantial impact of the reforms. Thus without any reforms (as 
from 1992) contributions would have reached 41.7% in 2030 according to the Prognos 87 lower scenario. The 
impact of the Pension Reform Act of 1992 (RRG 1992) was to lower contribution rates to 26.9%. The Old Age 
Insurance Sustainability Act of 2004 additionally lowered contribution rates down to 22% in 2030. Clearly to 
compensate just a part of the contribution reductions, substantial private savings are needed. 
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perspective has a more peripheral role, whereas legitimacy is now provided by referring 
to the instrumentality of social security for economic growth or social policy as a 
productive factor.  
A third point concerns expansion of additional old age pensions through 
occupational and individual schemes. The aim of this expansion is to close the gap as a 
result of reduced statutory provision. In this context the government offers: 
Massive state support … for such private and occupational retirement provision, 
the promotion measures ensuring in particular that those on low wages can also 
make provision to the envisaged degree. The Old Age Income Act (Alterseinkünfte-
gesetz), which entered into force on 1 January 2005, creates an attractive 
framework for additional old-age pensions. Conversion to downstream taxation 
decreases the burden on employee income, thereby releasing additional funds 
which are to be used for private old-age pensions (Op.cit: 10).  
In this case the concern for public cost-containment is not mentioned although there 
must be a cost of the «massive state support» and «downstream taxation» in the form of 
tax expenditures and direct subsidies.13 However as mentioned previously these costs 
and especially the tax expenditures belong to the hidden welfare state. This increased 
reliance on tax expenditures in financing pensions seem to be a trend across many 
countries implementing new pension reforms involving a greater role for the private 
sector. In this way contribution rates and tax levels are seemingly contained, but some 
of the costs pop up as more or less hidden tax expenditures. This also gives evidence to 
the focus on public cost-containment, not necessarily on costs and total costs per se. As 
referred to above Schmäl points out that the private contribution rate also will increase.  
As concerns the minimum security part of the adequacy concept the government in 
2003 introduced a basic insurance in old age. This is a social assistance benefit, to be 
drawn by those in need. These are people above the age of 65 as well as from the age of 
18 and onwards, and whose earning capacity are fully reduced in the long term for 
medical reasons. Need is defined in terms of available income and assets. If these are 
not sufficient to acquire necessary subsistence this qualifies for receiving the benefit. 
The standard of living dimension of adequacy is provided through the statutory old age 
insurance which remains the first and most important pillar of the old-age pension 
provision. However, the future will bring about a change towards increased reliance on 
second and third pillar provision in order to achieve standard security. Again, it is the 
goal of safeguarding pensions in the long run through public cost-containment that 
impinge on the standard security element. As described above the core of the Old Age 
Pensions Insurance Sustainability Act of 2004 addresses this by introducing the 
sustainability factor in the pension adjustment formula. In addition the promotion of 
second and third pillar pensions through subsidies and tax incentives is meant to 
compensate the reduction in first pillar provision.  
The solidarity aspect is secured through elements in the statutory old age pension, 
above all this concerns the risk of premature incapacity for earning and more generally 
                                                 
13 Downstream taxation implies a so-called EET regime of taxation, where contributions and fund income is 
exempted from taxation, whereas pensions benefits are taxed.  
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the contribution measurement which disregards any factors such as state of health, other 
risks or gender.14  
Finally it should be mentioned that since the key issue of the OMC process on 
pensions is financial sustainability, the European Employment Strategy and the BEPG 
is included as part of the OMC on pensions and hence a high level of employment is a 
priority.  
UK:  Con t i nuance ,  i nd i v i dua l  c ho i c e  and  pens i on  
educa t i on  
How does the UK government act to secure the goals set by the OMC in pensions? The 
UK NSR (2002) initially stresses the substantial contribution to retirement security made 
by its long-established history of occupational and personal pension provision. The 
broad strategic objectives outlined could be seen as continuing this historical path of 
pension provision. For today’s pensioners the goals are to combat poverty and ensure 
that saving is rewarded and for future pensioners to encourage saving through the 
private sector where that is suitable and to make available security for those who need to 
rely on state provision (UK 2002: 3). The means of obtaining these objectives are to 
provide a minimum income level for pensioners, to offer new products which reward 
savings, broadening access to affordable second pensions, provide products and 
information to encourage people to save and to help people understand their pension 
options. Thus, also as regards the means, the institutional legacies of the past are 
sustained in terms of combining public provision of minimum pensions with an 
extensive system of occupational and private provision. Adequacy and sustainability in 
the UK context of public provision is seen to be closely interconnected in the following 
way:  
The Government has set clear priorities for public spending on pensions and 
benefits for older people which keep it sustainable under demographic pressures 
and maintain its ability to meet real social needs. Public spending on pensions in 
future decades is projected to remain at broadly around current levels as a 
proportion of GDP. This follows from a choice to focus state resources on low 
income households and link these entitlements to growth in national prosperity, 
rather than focussing funding on earnings-related support which would direct 
funds to higher income groups (op.cit: 3).  
Thus, sustainability is understood within a public expenditure context wherein 
sustainability means to keep public expenditure (in this case public pension expenditure) 
at a fairly low level. This is paralleled by an understanding of adequacy which is confined 
to minimum security, where the state has a direct responsibility in terms of provision. 
Adequacy in terms of income related security is not considered as a key concern for the 
state in terms of provision. The argument is that there exists a basic choice between 
either targeting resources on low income households or to fund income-related benefits 
                                                 
14 Solidarity is also built into the system via compensation for periods were no contributions are made, for instance 
during child-rearing, which is paid for by subsidies from the Federation based on general revenue. Additional old 
age pensions also contain such solidarity elements for instance unisex tariffs applicable since 2006 onwards and 
pensions for incapacity. The introduction of downstream taxation is seen as a solidarity element in allowing 
younger cohorts to contribute to a pension more easily and postpone taxation until old age. 
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for higher income groups, i.e. the possibility of combining both goals within a public 
system, is not seen as an option. Thus, both an institutional path dependency and an 
ideological adherence to targeting of resources inform the basic strategy of the UK and 
how the concepts of adequacy and sustainability are structured. In its turn this is also 
reflected in the means chosen to obtain the common sub-goals of the OMC process.  
As concern the adequacy of pensions the strategy of the government is to maintain 
and support the major contribution made by the private pension sector in enabling 
pensioners to enjoy economic growth and to target state resources on improving the 
position of the poorest relative to rising national wealth (op.cit: 5). To tackle low 
incomes among older people the Minimum Income Gurantee was introduced in 1997 
and secures a minimum income level for all people above the age of 60. From 2003 the 
Pension Credit replaced the MIG and provides a minimum income, since the Pension 
Credit still contains a guaranteed income. The pension credit is more savings friendly 
than the previous arrangement for those in the lower income deciles with small savings.  
As concerns adequacy in terms of a reasonable income replacement, the focus of the 
government is on broadening the access to appropriate pension arrangements and 
enabling individuals to make informed choices about their living standard in retirement 
and the action they can take to achieve it: 
The Government does not attempt to define for its citizens what an appropriate 
level of income replacement should be. The focus of UK policy is on 
guaranteeing a minimum income for low income groups, expanding access to 
state second pensions for low earners, carers and disabled people, and improving 
information, awareness and the availability of suitable products to encourage 
others to make appropriate provision (op.cit: 8). 
The question of access includes the basic pension which makes up the foundation of 
retirement income. 98% of pensioners had income from this scheme in 2000/2001. 
The State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) introduced in 1978 provides 
small earning related benefits and people who contribute to a private or occupational 
pension contract out of SERPS and receive National Insurance Contributions (NIC) 
rebates that are to be used to build up a private pension. In 1996/97, 72.6% of 20–59 
years old (paying NICs) contracted out of SERPS. Within this area the main objective of 
the government is to secure that people has access to decent second pensions. This was 
done by introducing the State Second Pension in April 2002. Whereas SERPS only 
provides earnings-related benefits the new scheme will concentrate on helping lower 
paid, carers and disabled people. These were people with low or no entitlements to 
SERPS because of being out of work and hence not being able to pay contributions. 
The S2P scheme aims at securing that people earning more than the Lower Earnings 
Limit (currently £3900 a year – the level at which NIC’s became due) but less than 
around £10800 will be treated as if they had earned £10800 in that year. This will imply 
a doubling of the amount they would have received within the SERPS scheme.  
Moderate earners defined as up to around £24600 will also gain but on a gliding scale 
as compared with SERPS. Those at the moderate earners limit (£24600) get the same as 
before from their S2P. Carers and disabled people with broken work records will get 
about £1 a week S2P (Op.cit.: 9). In addition, the S2P will not have an impact on those 
near retirement age or those already retired from these groups with broken work 
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records. They will have to rely on the Basic Pension and the Pension Credit and possible 
contributions to occupational and private pensions. However, these groups are the most 
unlikely to contribute to a personal or occupational pension. There is a strong 
relationship between income and contribution to a private pension. The overall aim of 
the government is to continue and increase the reliance on occupational and private 
pensions. To obtain this groups on lower incomes have to be provided with greater 
access to contribution based schemes. Therefore the Stakeholder Pension was 
introduced in April 2001. The scheme has simple low charges (1% of fund value) 
flexibility for participants to vary contributions or move between schemes without any 
financial penalty, simplified tax arrangements with £3600 pa contribution limit and open 
to non-earners. From October the same year all employers with 5 or more employees 
are obliged to offer access to a stakeholder pension (unless they have their own 
occupational scheme or contribute to a personal pension on their employees’ behalf). 
The Stakeholder pension design follow the general move of pension schemes from 
being defined benefit schemes to defined contribution arrangements. This is also in line 
with the prominence put on personal responsibility for saving: 
..., the Government is also undertaking a range of initiatives to increase people’s 
understanding of the need to take responsibility for their retirement income to 
make sure they can make informed choices to achieve their expectations around 
living standard in retirement (op.cit: 11). 
Measures here include pension forecasts, money purchase illustrations and a pension 
education publicity campaign. The third sub-goal under the adequacy heading of 
promoting solidarity between and within generations is addressed by letting each 
generation pay for their own pensions via adequate savings and thus avoid rising taxes. 
Solidarity within generations consists of targeting public resources on low income 
pensioners and to promote volunteering by older people (op.cit: 12–13).  
In terms of financial sustainability the UK has reached and surpassed the 
employment goals of the EES. The basic strategy is to move people from welfare to 
work. The Jobseekers Allowance and New Deals programs all are intended to create 
work incentives. Tax credits and National Minimum Wage add to these measures. Age 
positive employment practices, combating age discrimination through implementation 
of age legislation aims at improving employment possibilities for older persons. There is 
also a voluntary New Deal program for those aged 50 and above. To make people stay 
longer in the labour market and above SPA pension increments are provided. In 
addition the current maximum deferral period of 5 years will be ended in 2010 and from 
this year increments for staying longer will be increased. 
Long-term fiscal projections show that public fiscal policy is sustainable over the 
long term. The UK public pension share as an important part of public fiscal 
sustainability is projected to fall from 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 4.4 per cent in 
2050. (These figures exclude the Pension Credit.) This is exceptional in a comparative 
perspective as this share is expected to rise in all other OECD countries. Generational 
account for the UK also projects that future taxation and spending is generationally 
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neutral, meaning that current generations are not favoured over future generations in 
terms of net lifetime tax transfers.15  
At the ideological level the government in the NSR 2005 report restates it’s 
commitment to a targeted system of public pension provision and with limited state 
responsibility beyond securing a minimum income for people in old age and hence to 
prevent poverty in retirement. Thus in terms of adequacy the UK Government: «aims to 
target State Pension spending at those who need it most» (UK 2005: 8). Regarding the 
question of maintaining living standards the report stresses that: «The UK may be 
distinct because they regard ‘target’ retirement income as something for individuals and 
families to choose themselves» (UK 2005: 5). In terms of sustainability three key factors 
are mentioned; increasing labour market participation and extending working life, 
wherein active ageing is central; promoting a system that includes public and private 
sector involvement, including a future of stronger private sector involvement and thirdly 
to increase future savings. It is argued that because of its history of private pension 
provision the UK is well placed to overcome the demographic challenge whilst keeping 
state expenditure on pensions sustainable in the future (op.cit: 42).16 
A key aspect of the UK strategy is the weight put on education in terms of financial 
education as this is laid out in the Informed Choice program which intends to help 
people to make informed and effective choices about working and saving for their 
retirement. Since the UK pension policy deliberately sets out to increase the importance 
of private pension sources the success of this critically depend on the trust in these 
institutions from the public at large and in addition that individuals as market actors in 
this field are competent in terms of knowledge and action to make the right choices. 
The mis-selling of personal pensions threatened this trust and the government therefore 
compensated the victims of mis-selling and introduced the Pension Protection Fund to 
                                                 
15 Given the importance of occupational and private pensions within the UK system objective 10 concerning the 
appropriate regulatory frameworks and management needed in order to provide private and public funded pension 
schemes that offer efficient, affordable, portable and secure pensions should be mentioned. In the UK this 
concerns private and occupational pension schemes. Here the basic strategy is to ensure that the stability of 
investment in funded schemes is secured through macroeconomic policies designed to deliver stable long-term 
growth, through competitive markets, and appropriate regulation. In addition regulations are increasingly seen as 
needed to provide security for members of these schemes. It is the Pension Act of 1995 that forms the basis of 
regulation of private pensions. Occupational pensions have to be set up under trust law in order to benefit from tax 
relief. Trust law implies that responsibility for running the scheme is placed on a third party, legally separated from 
employers and members. The regulatory regime includes the Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority which is 
able to take action if breaches of the Pension Act occur, Minimum Funding Requirement which describes 
minimum funding levels. This regulation will be changed providing a new regime for scheme funding in line with 
the requirements of the proposals for an EU directive on the activities of institutions for occupational retirement 
provision. For private pensions the Financial Service Authority is the statutory regulator. This Authority assumed 
its power in 2001. Framework and objectives is set up in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The 
statutory objectives of the FSA are Market confidence, Public awareness, Consumer protection, and reduction of 
financial crime. This is secured through several measures to protect consumers, regulate industry and by providing 
rules on particular firms. The FSA also have provided redress for consumers because of the mis-selling of private 
pension products in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although intended to provide security and confidence all the 
regulations adds to the complexity of the system. Therefore the Government aims to simplify the occupational and 
personal pensions system. The Pickering and Sandler reviews reporting in 2002 both included proposals to simplify 
provision and regulation. 
16 As concerns modernisation the UK response is to facilitate labour mobility and movement across borders, secure 
fairer outcomes and gender equality and to implement the Informed Choice program that includes raising 
awareness and education, a web based planner, pension forecasts, partnerships and improving public services for 
older people. In addition it aims at improving public debate and building consensus on reforms (op.cit: 40). 
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protect people in the event of insolvency of their employer.17 In addition appropriate 
regulation is also needed to rebuild confidence in non-state forms of saving. In this 
context financial education could be seen as an additional measure helping individuals to 
avoid such situations. The key precondition for the voluntarist approach to be 
successful is that people make informed decisions and act accordingly in order to secure 
that the preferred individual target level is obtained. This is why financial education is 
vital within this perspective. It is all about creating competent, autonomous and rational 
market actors without questioning the market logic itself. Or rather, the focus on 
education and information should be seen as a way of increasing the legitimacy of the 
market, by reducing asymmetry of information and hence to approach the ideal of the 
perfect market. In a situation where market actors are seen as competent, it is also easier 
to blame individuals if something goes wrong, i.e. for instance if their chosen target 
replacement rate ends up not being fulfilled, because the individual originally posited the 
information and knowledge to make wise decisions and hence is seen as responsible for 
the outcome.18  
This strategy aims to ensure that people in UK are better informed so as to be 
able to take greater responsibility for their financial affairs and play a more active 
role in the market for financial services (UK 2005: 15).  
Focus on the individual’s capability in terms of knowledge and information to make 
rational decisions about savings tend to eschew the question of capability in terms of 
resources somewhat into the background. But this question comes to mind especially 
for groups with poor resources. The situation is paradoxical in that those groups that 
potentially could benefit from the financial education often are situated in societal and 
economic contexts where long term planning for the future takes the back seat of 
priority, which is determined by day to day struggles for making ends meet. Instable 
working careers with many short-term contracts, health problems and low pay all 
contribute to this situation where short term planning and immediate concerns take 
precedence. It could be argued that the emphasis on education in long term financial 
planning and rational calculation fits better within a middle class context of more secure 
and long term employment and a sufficient income to save from. However, as the 
concept of «under-saving» is applied this clearly shows that the government is aware of 
the distributional aspect of the individual capability approach and its limits within an 
economy of still substantial income inequalities. What is clear is that in this way the New 
Labour slogan of «Education, education and education» also trickles into the pension 
discourse.  
                                                 
17 The regulation of private pensions became a prominent issue in the early 1990s. In 1991 a leading newspaper 
owner, Robert Maxwell, had misappropriated occupational pension funds to shore up unsuccessful businesses. The 
second scandal, concerned the mis-selling of personal pensions, where individuals were encouraged by agents eager 
for commissions to opt out of SERPS even if it was not in their interest to do so (Larsen and Daguerre 2002–2003: 
12). Both of these scandals revealed a serious lack of regulation of the private pension industry. 
18 The importance of financial education is also stressed in a life course perspective wherein the Department of Work 
and Pensions (DWP) assesses the potential for a school based financial education study that would focus on 
delivering a pension-related element of financial education that would be meaningful and engaging for children 
(UK 2005: 16).  
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No rway :  Sus t a i nab i l i t y  t h r ough  demog raph i c  
ad j u s tmen t s  and  a  n ew  d i v i s i on  o f  pens i on  p i l l a r s   
Norwegian reform plans was initiated by setting up a Pension Commission which was 
appointed by the Stoltenberg I Government (Labour Party) on 30 March 2001. The 
Commission was empowered to clarify the main objectives and principles underpinning 
a comprehensive pension system. The Government stressed the importance of a future 
pension system characterised by stability, simplicity and a long-term perspective, at the 
same time contributing to meeting the challenges related to ageing and an increasing 
tendency to retire early. An ageing population combined with increased pension benefits 
will contribute toward a sharp increase in pension expenditures in coming decades. The 
reform is expected to take effect as from 2010. The title of the report was «Modernised 
National Insurance: Sustainable pension for the future» and thus the focus on 
sustainability and modernisation parallels the key goals of the OMC process. The 
Pension Commission emphasised the importance of work as the basis for common 
welfare and as the most important resource of the nation. It also stressed that the 
National Insurance Scheme (NIS) should be the main element of the overall pension 
system. However, to be able to accomplish this, the NIS must not promise more than it 
can deliver in the long run. The Pension Commission warned against relying on 
increased taxation: 
The ability to pay taxes and premiums is enhanced when the economy and 
businesses are doing well. However, a high and increasing tax level may make 
production too costly, thus undermining our financial safety and welfare (Pension 
Commission, English version 2004: 2).  
This is implicitly close to the tax competition view of globalisation wherein tax increases 
are excluded from the policy framework defined by the Pension Commission. In 
addition, the Pension Commission questioned the viability of what they call the 
Norwegian model of intergenerational solidarity. The sharp increase in the number of 
elderly will put this model under strain. In order to avoid generational conflict, the 
system has to be restructured accordingly. On the other hand, the Pension Commission 
pointed out the possibility of lessening the burden by stimulating growth and work. In 
the same manner, the building up of wealth through the Pension Fund will help smooth 
out intergenerational and business cycle effects. 
Three factors are pointed out as crucial motivations for the need for reform that all 
point to the centrality of sustainability as the key issue of pension reform: the sharp 
increase in the number of retirees, the doubling of pension expenditures if nothing is 
done, and the fact that petroleum revenues are insufficient to absorb the increase in 
pension expenditure. Against the background of demographic and economic challenges, 
the Pension Commission suggested 10 main proposals for pension reform. In the table 
below the most important of these are allocated under the three overarching goals as 
found in the OMC in pensions: 
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Table 3. Adequacy, Financial sustainability and modernisation goals of the Norwegian pension reform 
plan. 
Adequacy Financial Sustainability Modernisation 
Everyone is to be guaranteed a 
minimum pension from the 
National Insurance Scheme  
Pensions to be related to overall lifetime 
income 
Supplementary 
pension schemes are 
to be organised so as 
to make them clearly 
an add-on to the 
National Insurance 
Scheme  
Unpaid care for children and for 
sick, disabled or elderly people 
to give entitlement to pension 
benefits. (Also relevant for 
modernisation 
The pension one receives is to be related 
to the contributions one pays to the 
pension scheme. Earned pension to 
increase in line with wage growth. (also 
an Adequacy element) 
 
Pension payments are to be 
adjusted annually in line with 
the mean of wage and price 
changes. This will apply to 
anyone who receives a pension 
payment after the reform 
becomes effective  
The longer one defers retirement, the 
higher pension one will receive and vice 
versa 
 
Introducing an obligatory 
occupational pension system 
(Also to be placed under the 
sustainability heading)* 
Future pension benefits will be calculated 
on the basis of remaining life expectancy 
at 67 years for the age group to which 
one belongs. If life expectancy increases, 
one will have to postpone retirement to 
receive the same pension  
 
 A new Government Pension Fund is to be 
created on the basis of the Government 
Petroleum Fund and the National 
Insurance Fund. The purpose is to 
establish a closer link between fund 
capital and government pension 
obligations 
 
Source: Own composition based on NOU 2004 
* The Pension Commission was split on this issue: A majority did not favour mandatory occupational 
pensions. However such a system was enacted in 2006 
As the table reveals most of the propositions may be classified under the sustainability 
heading, although some of the reform elements also could be seen to serve adequacy 
and modernisation goals. The most important measure to improve future financial 
sustainability of the pension system is the life expectancy adjustment measure. It implies 
a strong economic incentive for continuing work as life expectancy increases. The 
principle behind the life expectancy adjustment is that different expectations of the 
number of pension years will result in different yearly pension benefits, but that overall 
or total benefits will remain constant for the same level of earned pensions. Thus, if new 
cohorts of retirees are expected to live longer than previous cohorts, the annual pension 
will be less. To counteract this, the individual may choose to work longer. To illustrate, 
if life expectancy increases by one year, the retirement age has to increase by 8 months 
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to compensate. This is the case in Sweden, which is comparable to Norway in this 
respect (NOU 2004:1, p. 110). The life expectancy adjustment ratio will be the same for 
men and women. As the adjustment ratios are put into effect, the replacement ratio, if 
retiring at 67, will gradually be reduced. Thus people will be stimulated to work longer in 
order to achieve a satisfactory degree of compensation. To avoid this effect on 
replacement rates, each age cohort must postpone retirement by 2, 5–3 years by 2050. It 
is expected that in terms of cost, this measure will reduce expenditures by 18% in 2050, 
compared to prolonging the existing system. This proposal is the most important one in 
terms of cost reductions and sustainability. The principle of lifelong contributions aims 
at securing that all working years shall give rise to pension entitlements and hence create 
a much stronger link between labour incomes and pensions than is currently the case. It 
implies a removal of the present best earnings rule (the 20 best years) and 40 years rule 
(i.e. the number of years required to obtain a full pension for a given pension level). The 
Pension Commission proposed a ceiling on annual income that qualifies for pension 
entitlements. For those with income at this ceiling, the new reform will represent the 
largest gain in terms of benefit increases compared with the present system. This results 
directly from the proposal for a close correlation between pension level, labour income 
and pension contributions. Today, income that exceeds the upper ceiling of 12G for 
earning pension points as well as incomes in the range of 6G-12G with reduced pension 
earnings also pay full NIS contributions on this part of their incomes. This adds to the 
general tax financing and redistributive character of the present system. By removing 
these elements, the Pension Commission aimed at providing a clearer individual 
ownership for the pension part of the NIS.19  
The flexible retirement proposal provides the opportunity to take out an early 
retirement under the NIS upon reaching the age of 62. The basic principle is that each 
individual should meet the main cost of choosing to take early retirement, whereas each 
individual will receive a correspondingly higher pension if he or she chooses to prolong 
working life. The underlying motivation and legitimisation is the principle of actuarially 
correct deductions present in private insurance. However, this principle was somewhat 
modified since the Pension Commission proposed that an amount of NOK 30000 of 
the earned pension will be paid out irrespective of retirement age.20 This means that 
individuals with low entitlements will face a relatively smaller reduction than those with 
high entitlements. Here it should be added that the possibility for taking early retirement 
was restricted. Only those with an earned pension after adjustment (actuarial deduction 
and the NOK 30000 amount), that is above the guaranteed pension would have the 
possibility to make use of early retirement, i.e., before the age of 67 (NOU 2004:1, 
p.124).  
                                                 
19 However, it does not mean that these higher incomes will have lower taxes at the general level, only that these taxes 
are removed from being part of the pension scheme financing to the general income tax system, i.e., in the form of 
taxes on gross income (confer NOU 2004:1, p. 141). 
20 The non-adjustable amount of NOK 30000 within the flexible retirement scheme will be adjusted in value terms as 
an average of price- and wage growth over time. With an expected wage growth in excess of price growth, the non-
adjustable amount as a value of wages will be reduced, and the pension system will gradually approach a system of 
purely actuarially correct adjustments of pensions. 
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As concerns adequacy the introduction of a guaranteed pension represents a stronger 
targeting of basic pensions than does the present system. The present system of basic 
security pensions consists of two elements: a universal (categorical) basic pension (age 
and residence) and a special supplement (særtillegg) that is tested against the income-
related part of the pension. In this way, every citizen is secured a minimum pension. 
The new proposal of a guaranteed pension extends the targeting through pension 
income testing for the whole basic security element of the pension. Unpaid care credits 
implies more favourable pension entitlements based on unpaid care for one’s own 
children below school age and for sick, disabled or elderly people as compared to the 
present arrangement introduced in 1992.  
Compared to continuing the present system, the recommendations of the Pension 
Commission are somewhat uncertainly assessed to lead to a reduction of expenditures 
on old age pension, of about 20%. This suggests that pension spending in 2050 will 
amount to 12, 5% of GDP, i.e., 2, 7% point lower than what an un-reformed system 
would require. In this case, pension spending would be 15.2% of GDP in 2050.  
As mentioned above the Pension Commission was divided on the issue of 
introducing mandatory occupational pensions. Since the Pension Commission was 
divided and a majority opposed the introduction of mandatory occupational pensions, 
this topic gained increasing momentum as part of the tariff negotiations in 2004. The 
outcome was an agreement between the labour market parties to establish an 
arrangement securing a supplementary pension through the labour market for every 
employee. However, it was understood that the government had to contribute in some 
way to establish such an arrangement. On December 10, 2004, the Bondevik II 
government presented its report No. 12 (2004–2005) to the parliament, «Pension 
Reform – Safeguarding Our Pensions» which included its intention of providing a 
system of mandatory occupational pensions (Finansdepartementet 2004–2005). On May 
the 19th. 2005, an agreement on the main structure of the future pension system was 
reached between five political parties encompassing the three Government parties: 
Conservative, Christian People’s and Liberal, and two of the opposition parties: Labour 
and Centre party (Finansdepartementet 2005). The parliament decided on the 26th of 
May that legislative rules on a mandatory occupational pension scheme to take effect on 
the 1st of January 2006.  
To complete the understanding of this issue, it is important to note that a new 
framework for existing and new occupational pensions had already been legislated in 
2000 and implemented as of 2001. The legislation provides for occupational schemes 
based on defined contribution plans and for elements of defined contribution to be 
included in existing pension schemes based on defined benefit. All these arrangements 
are net coordinated schemes, and the law excluded gross coordinated schemes within 
the private sector from being tax deductible expenses for firms (NHO 2004: 14). In this 
way, the model of the private insurance scheme based on defined contributions and the 
principle of actuarial fairness, i.e., reflecting the logic of the third pension pillar, was 
established within the system of occupational pensions and thus broke with the 
traditional defined benefit arrangements. Since all this happened before the 
establishment of the Pension Commission, it became a natural reference point for 
discussing the specific topic of reform of occupational pensions and also more generally 
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concerning the NIS scheme itself. Here the recommendations of the Commission 
represent a movement towards the principle of actuarial fairness.  
As concerns the other main proposals of the Commission the Bondevik government:  
… agrees with the main principles underpinning the proposal for a modernised 
National Insurance Scheme, as launched by the majority of the members of the 
Pension Commission, but acknowledges that there may be a need for changes and 
additional review of certain aspects (Finansdepartmentet (2004–2005). 
One aspect that is in need of change according to the government is the gender profile 
of the original Pension Commission proposal. Here the government proposes to create 
a more balanced system by improving pension entitlements based on unpaid care work 
and by offering increased access to early retirement. On this point, the government has 
responded to the critical voices emanating through the consultation round and the 
general debate following the submission of the Commission’s report. In addition the 
distributive profile of benefits is changed so as to provide better provision for those on 
low and middle incomes as compared to the Commission proposal (Innst.S. nr. 195 
(2004–2005)). 
Still, the most important principle in terms of cost savings, i.e., the life expectancy 
adjustment ratio, is supported by the government and encompasses a broad consensus 
in the parliament. At a general level then, the government proposal represents a 
moderate turn away from the dominant economic incentive thinking of the original 
proposal by giving gender, distributive and social concerns a somewhat stronger say in 
the scheme. As concerns specific contribution rules or specified threshold amounts or 
rates for a new pension system, these more concrete measures are to be discussed in 
connection with the recent issuing (October 2006) of a government white paper to 
Stortinget (the Parliament ) (St.meld. nr. 5 (2006–2007)).21  
Comparative discussion and some preliminary 
conclusions 
The introduction of this paper posed two questions Does the OMC process promote a 
particular kind of pension system model through its goal of providing adequate, 
sustainable and modernized pensions? How does it compare to and does it challenge 
existing national systems as found in the three selected cases in terms of their 
institutional and normative foundations? In addition, the paper briefly has discussed in 
what way the OMC in pension potentially impact national pension debates and reforms. 
In terms of institutional set up the OMC pension structure consists of a public 
pension pillar that still has a major but relatively less important role in providing income 
in old age as compared to the present system. A stronger focus on poverty prevention 
within the first pillar is envisaged, whereas standard security is increasingly to be 
provided through second pillar occupational and third pillar private pensions.  
                                                 
21 The broad agreement between the major political parties in May 2005 kept the pension reform issue to a large 
degree outside the election campaign of 2005. A red-green three party government (Stoltenberg II) took office in 
October 2005 headed by Jens Stoltenberg from the Labour Party. 
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In addition to the new division between pension pillars, the «OMC pension regime» 
implies normative changes within pension pillars as well: This includes strengthening the 
employment friendliness of the first pillar by introducing actuarial deductions and 
bonuses into the retirement decision, to reinforce the link between contributions and 
pension benefits, to introduce demographic adjustments into the pension formula so 
that each generation face the costs of increasing longevity. In short these normative 
changes points to a future of increasing individual responsibility for the risks of old age 
in terms of income security. Also within second pillar occupational pensions these 
normative elements are making their way as traditional defined benefit schemes are 
replaced or added by defined contribution systems. A twofold process of institutional 
and normative change is foreseen by this pension edifice, in terms of a shifting balance 
towards increasing reliance on more market conform systems of provision through 
occupational and private pension institutions and secondly by a partial internal 
normative identity shift characterised by a more prominent role of core elements from 
private pension schemes.  
However, this shift towards more market conform or economic action based 
provision is not hegemonic or total. The acknowledgement of unpaid care work in 
determining pension benefits, the adherence to greater equality between men and 
women and most importantly prevention of social exclusion reveals the presence of a 
social justice or solidaristic action perspective.  
To conclude then, the pension edifice of the OMC points towards a multi-pillar 
design and away from the European Continental design (Bismarckian) in terms of 
reducing the statutory social insurance provision and providing a greater scope for 
private pensions. Greater scope for funded elements in addition to PAYG financing is 
also an important trait that challenges especially the Continental design, but also the 
Nordic model to some extent. Focus on poverty avoidance and social exclusion of older 
persons also confronts the Bismarckian systems and their identity with the principle of 
living standard. At the same time the focus on social exclusion and poverty prevention 
addresses weaknesses in the Beveridgean model with traditionally high levels of pension 
poverty and income inequality.  
Because of this it could also be portrayed as a hybrid model of pension provision 
containing elements from all three pension systems and so recent pension reforms 
seems to fit the hybridization view put forward by Zeitlin (2003). But this observation 
must be further qualified since it is really «hybridization with a bias» that are taking 
place, i.e. a new pension blend that contain fewest traits from the Continental or 
Bismarckian model and with more prominence to elements known from multi-pillar 
systems as well as minimum pension guarantees as found in the new post-reform 
Nordic model.  
The importance of financial sustainability, especially confined to the need of 
containing public pension spending within the OMC for pensions has clear and 
different implications for the three national cases discussed here: 
For the UK financial sustainability in this meaning is not seen to represent any 
challenge to the system of pension provision. Public expenditures are comparatively low 
and are, in contrast to all other countries, expected to be reduced in the future. Thus 
with confidence the UK in observing the OMC in pensions can continue the historical 
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path followed with a strong role of occupational and private provision and public 
spending targeted on the poor.22  
For the German case financial sustainability is the key challenge that underscores the 
need for more paradigmatic changes in terms of reducing public pillar provision by 
stabilising contribution rates and by increasing reliance on second and third pillar 
provision.  
Also for Norway the reform strategy focuses on the issue of financial sustainability, 
which motivates introduction of demographic adjustments in the public pension 
formula and also increased reliance on second pillar pensions in the form of a system of 
mandatory occupational pensions. Clearly revenues from oil production fed into the 
Pension Fund eases the financial burden for Norway, but still this fact has not turned 
Norway on a different track than the general direction of international pension reforms, 
although it may have postponed reforms.   
What is the possible impact of the OMC in pensions on national reforms? Based on 
the limited empirical material analysed here a complete and definite answer can not be 
provided and the focus is on potential impact more than on factual influence. The paper 
has focused on the ideational dimension of discourse (Schmidt 2001) and have 
emphasised firstly, how a particular understanding of financial sustainability has framed 
some policy solutions as legitimate whereas others have been excluded. Secondly, the 
primacy of financial sustainability has also impacted how the issue of adequacy is 
outlined and which policy solutions that are seen as being congruent with financial 
sustainability. In this way discourse may have an impact by drawing the borders between 
legitimate and excluded policy solutions. Observing that national reforms or reform 
elements fit or follows the OMC is no proof of OMC influence since its policy 
recommendations are not unique but resembles that of other international actors such 
as the OECD and the World Bank as well as that of particular actors within national 
policy communities. But the importance of the OMC process for national reforms could 
be its ability to reinforce reform topics on the national agenda that are in line with the 
OMC on pensions and provide national actors promoting such measures with additional 
support. In this respect the OMC in pensions may have more significance than the 
other international actors mentioned, because of the closer interaction between the 
member states and the Commission.  
It is when we situate the OMC process within a broader framework of European 
policy initiatives and focuses on the interaction between these processes the potential 
impact is spelled out more clearly. Thus, the OMC on pensions could be seen as an 
arena where competing policy paradigms and policy communities are struggling for 
hegemony. This is also evidenced in terms of the division of labour between Economic 
Policy Committee (EPC) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) as concerns the 
                                                 
22 The UK could be considered as an experiment in confronting a double challenge: increasing reliance on market 
mechanism in providing retirement income and at the same time securing adequacy for more people. The strategy 
challenges the view of welfare state researchers that targeting benefits on the poor makes for poor social policy. 
Can increasing targeting on the poor reduce poverty rates? And given existing and growing inequalities of pay and 
incomes, will increasing reliance on private provision manage to provide adequate pensions for those on middle 
and low incomes? There is also a conflict between increasing market provision and the need to regulate in order to 
provide pension products available to low and middle income people. Too much regulation can increase costs of 
provision and so exclude those on lower incomes.  
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three overarching goals. Here the EPC is to develop indicators particularly for the long-
term financial sustainability of pension systems and prepares simulations to be carried 
out by the member states. On the other hand the SPC is to have a particular focus on 
the adequacy of pensions and adaptation to a changing society (modernisation) (SPC 
and EPC 2001: 10). The 11 goals of pension policy reflect this struggle of trying to 
balance the social and the economic perspective and by expressing the goals rather 
broadly. One such tension is seen in the conceptualisation of solidarity from an 
understanding that stresses a collective and redistributive orientation towards a form of 
individualist solidarity underling a clear link between contribution and rewards. In this 
way the struggle between «economic» and «solidaristic» action (Leibfried 2005) is also 
part of the OMC process as well as national reform processes. Going back to what was 
said initially about different pension institutions and their adhering discourses and 
European market initiatives we may foresee a two stage process towards increasing 
market making, linking the OMC in pension and the build up of a European 
competition regime. The first stage involves two key elements of the OMC: The move 
towards increasing reliance on second and third pillar provision is a step towards 
increasing market reliance in pension provision. The second element concerns the 
internal restructuring of each pension pillar wherein traces from an «economic» market 
discourse grow and so gradually weakens the particular institutional identity and 
legitimacy of pension institutions building on a non-market redistributive logic. In this 
way the OMC process increases the numbers of «market traces» (Schulte 1999, quoted 
in Leibfried 2005: 266) and so gradually redefines the border between economic and 
solidaristic action. The effect would then be to expand the area of economic action and 
hence to be absorbed by a second stage of continuing processes of European market 
making. Whatever the result of this process of boundary drawing it reveals the 
systematic importance of discourse as one factor determining this outcome.  
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Annex I: Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
«Implementing a new open method of coordination. 
37.  Implementation of the strategic goal will be facilitated by applying a new open 
method of coordination as the means of spreading best practice and achieving 
greater convergence towards the main EU goals. This method, which is designed 
to help Member States to progressively develop their own policies, involves: 
 - fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving 
the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms; 
 - establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and 
benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of different 
Member States and sectors as a means of comparing best practice; 
 - translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by 
setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account national and 
regional differences; 
 - periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as mutual learning 
processes. 
38. A fully decentralised approach will be applied in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, 
as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using 
variable forms of partnership. A method of benchmarking best practices on 
managing change will be devised by the European Commission networking with 
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different providers and users, namely the social partners, companies and 
NGOs.» (European Council 2000).  
Annex II: OMC in pensions 
«Adequacy of pensions 
Member states should safeguard the capacity of pension systems to meet their social 
objectives. To this end against the background of their specific national circumstances 
they should: 
1. Ensure that older people are not placed at risk of poverty and can enjoy a decent 
standard of living: that they share in the economic well-being of their country 
and can accordingly participate actively in public, social and cultural life,23 
2. Provide access for all individuals to appropriate pension arrangements, public 
and/or private, which allow them to earn pension entitlements enabling them to 
maintain, to a reasonable degree, their living standards after retirement; and 
3. Promote solidarity within and between generations 
 
Financial sustainability of pension systems  
Member States should follow a multi-faceted strategy to place pension systems on a 
sound financial footing, including a suitable combination of policies to: 
4. Achieve a high level of employment through, where necessary, comprehensive 
labour market reforms, as provided by the European Employment Strategy and 
in a way consistent with the BEPG;. 
5. Ensure that, alongside labour market and economic policies, all relevant branches 
of social protection, in particular pension systems, offer effective incentives for 
the participation of older workers; that workers are not encouraged to take up 
early retirement and are not penalised for staying in the labour market beyond 
the standard retirement age; and that pension systems facilitate the option of 
gradual retirement; 
6. Reform pension systems in appropriate ways taking into account the overall 
objective of maintaining the sustainability of public finances. At the same time 
sustainability of pensions needs to be accompanied by sound fiscal policies, 
including where necessary, a reduction of debt.24 Strategies adopted to meet this 
objective may also include setting up dedicated pension reserve funds; 
7. Ensure that pension provisions and reforms maintain a fair balance between the 
active and the retired by not overburdening the former and by maintaining 
adequate pensions for the latter; and 
8. Ensure, through appropriate regulatory frameworks and through sound 
management, that private and public funded pension schemes can provide 
pensions with the required efficiency, affordability, portability and security. 
                                                 
23 «In this respect, benefits and tax advantages other than pensions should also be taken into account where 
appropriate». 
24 «Member States strategies to ensure sound and sustainable finances are reported and assessed in the framework of 
the BEPG and the Stability and Growth Pact and should be in accordance with these». 
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Modernisation of pension systems in response to changing needs of the economy, society and individuals 
9. Ensure that pension systems are compatible with the requirements of flexibility 
and security on the labour market; that, without prejudice to the coherence of 
Member States’ tax systems, labour market mobility within Member States and 
across borders and non-standard employment forms do not penalise people’s 
pension entitlements and that self-employment is not discouraged by pension 
systems; 
10. Review pension provisions with a view to ensuring the principle of equal 
treatment between women and men, taking into account obligations under EU 
law; and 
11. Make pension systems more transparent and adaptable to changing 
circumstances, so that citizens can continue to have confidence in them. Develop 
reliable and easy-to-understand information on the long-term perspectives of 
pension systems, notably with regard to the likely evolution of benefit levels and 
contribution rates. Promote the broadest possible consensus regarding pension 
policies and reforms. Improve the methodological basis for efficient monitoring 
of pension reforms and policies» (SPC and EPC 2001: 6–7).  
Annex III: Main proposals of the Norwegian 
Pension Commission: 
1. «Pensions are to be related to overall lifetime income. 
2. Everyone is to be guaranteed a pension that is no lower than the current 
minimum public pension from the National Insurance Scheme.  
3. The pension one receives is to be related to the contributions one pays to the 
pension scheme. Earned pension to increase in line with wage growth.  
4. Unpaid care for children and for sick, disabled or elderly people to give 
entitlement to pension benefits.  
5. The longer one defers retirement, the higher pension one will receive. One may 
opt to receive a pension from the National Insurance Scheme upon reaching the 
age of 62, but the pension will, in that case, be lower than if one extends 
working life. The Government should focus its financial contribution for early 
retirement pensions on the general scheme and not on other schemes.  
6. Supplementary pension schemes are to be organised so as to make them clearly 
an add-on to the National Insurance Scheme.  
7. To make the pension system financially sustainable, the pension will be 
calculated on the basis of remaining life expectancy at 67 years for the age group 
to which one belongs. If life expectancy increases, one will have to postpone 
retirement to receive the same pension.  
8. The new rules should be introduced gradually, affecting mainly the coming 
generations of retirees. People born in 1950 and earlier will largely fall outside 
the scope of the reform. People born in 1965 and later will be fully 
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encompassed by the reform. People born during the years 1951–1964 will 
receive their pension from both the old and new systems.  
9. Pension payments are to be adjusted annually in line with the mean of wage and 
price changes. This will apply to anyone who receives a pension payment after 
the reform becomes effective.  
10. A new Government Pension Fund is to be created on the basis of the 
Government Petroleum Fund and the National Insurance Fund. The purpose is 
to establish a closer link between fund capital and government pension 
obligations.» (NOU 2004: 11–13). 
WORKING PAPER  10  –  2006 EUROPEAN PENSION  POLICY  INIT IAT IVES  AND NATIONAL  REFORMS 
 46
WORKING PAPERS ROKKANSENTERET (ISSN 1503‐0946) 
The publications can be ordered from Rokkansenteret, phone: +47 55 58 97 10, 
e‐mail: post@rokkan.uib.no, http://www.rokkansenteret.uib.no 
2006 
1‐2006  Martin Byrkjeland: Høgare utdanningstilbod på Vestlandet og i Agder‐fylka. Mai 2006. 
2‐2006  Svanaug Fjær: «Dagsverket – lavterskel arbeidstilbud for rusavhengige. Evalueringsrapport». 
Juni 2006. 
3‐2006  Birgit Skjelbred‐Knudsen Valde: «Norsk anti‐korrupsjonspolitikk – svar på behov eller utløst 
av en internasjonal trend». Juni 2006. 
4‐2006  Håkon  Høst:  «Kunnskapsstatus  vedrørende  rekruttering  og  utdanning  til  pleie‐  og 
omsorgstjenestene i nordiske land». Juni 2006. 
5‐2006  Ingrid  Helgøy,  Sturla  Herfindal  og  Torgeir  Sveri:  «Undersøkelse  av  hovedfags‐  og  master‐
studenters gjennomføring og vurdering av studiesituasjonen». Juni 2006. 
6‐2006  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «The  whole‐of‐government  approach  –  regulation, 
performance, and public‐sector reform». August 2006. 
7‐2006  Martin  Byrkjeland:  «Kortare  arbeidstid  −  Eit  oversyn  over  diskusjonen  om 
arbeidstidsforkortingar i Noreg 1880−2006». August 2006. 
8‐2006  Even Nilssen: «The EU Fight Against Poverty and Social Exclusion. Activation, Targeting and 
the Sustainability of the Welfare State». November  2006. 
9‐2006  Merethe Mæland Bertelsen: «Omorganisering av konkurransetilsynet». November 2006. 
10‐2006  Rune Ervik: «European Pension Policy Initiatives and National Reforms: Between Financial 
Sustainability and Adequacy». December 2006. 
2005 
1‐2005  Ivar A. Lima  og Agnete Vabø:  «Instituttstruktur og  fakultetsorganisering ved HF‐fakultetet, 
Universitetet i Bergen». Mai 2005. 
2‐2005  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Modalen: Fra off‐road til on‐line på 25 år». Mai 2005. 
3‐2005  Nanna Kildal: «Fra arbeidsbegrepets historie: Aristoteles til Marx». Mai 2005. 
4‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness and Kristin Rubecksen: «Autonomy and Control in the Norwegian 
Civil Service: Does Agency Form Matter?». September 2005. 
5‐2005  Per  Lægreid,  Paul  G.  Roness  and  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Regulating  Regulatory Organizations: 
Controlling Norwegian Civil Service Organizations». September 2005. 
6‐2005  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Regulatory Reforms and Agencification». November 2005. 
7‐2005  Anne  Lise  Fimreite  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Specialization  and  Coordination:  Implications  for 
Integration and Autonomy in a Multi‐Level System». November 2005. 
8‐2005  Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness  and Kristin Rubecksen: «Performance Management  in Practice – 
The Norwegian Way». November 2005. 
9‐2005  Stig Helleren: «Omstilling i Arbeidstilsynet: Tilsynsmeldingens konsekvenser for strategi og 
organisering». November 2005. 
10‐2005  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Nordic 
Central Governments: Towards a Transnational Regulatory State?». November 2005. 
11‐2005  Kari Ludvigsen and Kari Tove Elvbakken: «The Public, the Mother and the Child. Public Health 
Initiatives Promoting the Strong and Happy Child − Focusing on Food and Mental Health». 
December 2005. 
12‐2005  Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «Overcoming the Barrieres and Seizing the Opportunities for 
Active Ageing in Norway: Report from an Expert Panel Meeting». December 2005. 
13‐2005  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing and the Norwegian Health Care System». December 2005. 
14‐2005  Martin Byrkjeland og Knut Grove: «Perspektiv på bygdeutvikling». Desember 2005. 
15‐2005  Haldor Byrkjeflot: «The Rise of a Healthcare State? Recent Healthcare Reforms  in Norway». 
December 2005. 
16‐2005  Monica  Skjøld  Johansen:  «Penga  eller  livet?  Lederutfordringer  i  det  reformerte  norske 
sykehusvesenet». Desember 2005. 
17‐2005  Kirsti Malterud, Kari Tove Elvbakken og Per Solvang: «Helsekameratene. Gruppe for flerfaglig 
forskning  om  helse  og  sykdom  i  kulturelt  perspektiv, Universitetet  i Bergen  1999−2005». 
Desember 2005. 
EUROPEAN PENSION  POLICY  INIT IAT IVES  AND NATIONAL  REFORMS WORKING PAPER  10  -  2006  
  47
2004 
1‐2004  Dag  Olaf  Torjesen  and  Hallgeir  Gammelsæter:  «Management  Between  Autonomy  and 
Transparency in the Enterprise Hospital». January 2004.  
2‐2004  Haldor Byrkjeflot and Simon Neby: «The Decentralized Path Challenged? Nordic Health Care 
Reforms in Comparison». January 2004.  
3‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «The  Fragmented  State  –  the Challenges  of Combining 
Efficiency, Institutional Norms and Democracy». March 2004. 
4‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Europeisering av tilsynsmyndigheter i Norge og Sverige». Mars 2004. 
5‐2004  Karsten  Vrangbæk  and  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Introduction  of  Choice  in  Scandinavian 
Hospital Systems. Arguments and Policy Processes in the Danish and the Norwegian Case». 
March 2004.  
6‐2004  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Internationalization  at  Norwegian  Universities  and  Colleges  after  the 
Quality Reform». April 2004. The Globalization Program. 
7‐2004  Hans‐Tore  Hansen,  Anne  Hege  Trædal‐Henden,  Olaf  Jürgens  and  Wolfgang  Voges:  «Poverty 
among Households with Children: A Comparative Study of Lone Parents and Couples with 
Children in Norway and Germany». April 2004. 
8‐2004  Renate  Storetvedt  Lien  og  Arnhild  Taksdal  «Integrering  av  kjønnsperspektiv  i  offentlig 
tjenesteproduksjon og planlegging». Mai 2004. 
9‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy  og Synnøve Serigstad: «Tilsyn  som  styringsform  i  forholdet mellom  staten og 
kommunene». Mai 2004. 
10‐2004  Morten Dyrdal: «Legemiddeltilsyn og europeisering». September 2004. 
11‐2004  Bodil  Ravneberg:  «Økonomiske  insentiv  i  arbeidslinjen,  virker  det?  Evaluering  av 
forsøksordning med kvalifiseringsstønad i ’Prosjektet Amalie’ i Åsane». Oktober 2004. 
12‐2004  Per  Lægreid  and  Synnøve  Serigstad:  «Organizing  for  Homeland  Security:  The  Case  of 
Norway». November 2004. 
13‐2004  Ivar Bleiklie: «Institutional Conditions and  the Responsibilities of Universities». November 
2004. 
14‐2004  Lise Hellebø: «Food Safety at Stake – the Establishment of Food Agencies». November 2004. 
15‐2004  Katarina  Østergren:  «The  Institutional  Construction  of  Consumerism.  A  Study  of 
Implementing Quality Indicators». November 2004.  
16‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy and Anne Homme: «Governance  in Primary and Lower Secondary Education. 
Comparing Norway, Sweden and England». November 2004. 
17‐2004  Tom Christensen, Per Lægreid and  Inger Marie Stigen: «Performance Management and Public 
Sector Reform: The Norwegian Hospial Reform». December 2004. 
18‐2004  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Regulatory  Agencies  −  The  Challenges  of  Balancing 
Agency Autonomy and Political Control». December 2004. 
19‐2004  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Velferdsstat,  rettighetslovgivning  og  lokalt  selvstyre».  Desember 
2004. 
20‐2004  Kristin  Rubecksen:  «Civil  Service  Organizations  in  Norway:  Organizational  Features  and 
Tasks». December 2004. 
21‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «National  Versus  International 
Mergers in Unionised Oligopoly». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2004  Birte Folgerø  Johannessen: «Ledelse og evidens  i det psykiske helsevernet, konsekvenser  for 
kunnskapsforståelse og organisering». Desember 2004. 
23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
WORKING PAPER  10  –  2006 EUROPEAN PENSION  POLICY  INIT IAT IVES  AND NATIONAL  REFORMS 
 48
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen  og Per  Lægreid:  «Politisk  styring  og  privatisering:  holdninger  i  elitene  og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg  and Tor Helge Holmås:  «A Panel Data  Study  of  Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel:  «Two Lectures: The Concept  of Competence  –  an  Instrument  of  Social  and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
EUROPEAN PENSION  POLICY  INIT IAT IVES  AND NATIONAL  REFORMS WORKING PAPER  10  -  2006  
  49
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen:  «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk analyse av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín  José Menéndez  m.fl.:  «Taxing  Europe.  The  Case  for  European  Taxes  in  Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik  Andersson  and  Kai  A.  Konrad:  «Globalization  and  Risky  Human  Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik  Andersson  and  Kai  A.  Konrad:  «Human  Capital  Investment  and  Globalization  in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Hovedtyper  av  valgordninger.  Proporsjonalitet  eller  politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan  Erik  Askildsen,  Badi  H.  Baltagi  and  Tor  Helge  Holmås:  «Will  Increased  Wages  Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and  John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen  og  Jacob Aars:  «Teknologi  og demokrati. Med  norske  kommuner  på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob  Aars:  «Byfolk  og  politikk.  Gjennomgang  av  data  fra  en  befolkningsundersøkelse  i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
